Lessons from Charter Schools: What Makes a High Quality School? by Spees, Lisa
  
LESSONS FROM CHARTER SCHOOLS: WHAT MAKES A HIGH QUALITY SCHOOL? 
 
 
 
 
 
Lisa Spees 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department 
of Public Policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill  
2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
 
Krista M. Perreira 
Sudhanshu Handa 
Steven W. Hemelt 
Douglas Lauen 
Ted Mouw 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2016 
Lisa Spees 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Lisa Spees: Lessons from Charter Schools: What Makes a High Quality School? 
(Under the direction of Krista M. Perreira) 
This dissertation evaluates the differences between charter schools and traditional public 
schools and how these differences influence teachers and students. The first essay examines 
different methods for evaluating student achievement in charter schools and traditional public 
schools and the difficulties in disentangling the effect of charter schools from unobservable 
student background characteristics. In the second essay, I evaluate whether charter schools are 
influencing student’s non-cognitive abilities. Specifically, I determine whether attending charter 
schools affects students’ number of absences, tardies, and suspensions. Finally, the third essay 
examines whether charter schools are attracting and retaining more effective teachers than 
traditional public schools. In sum, this three essay dissertation provides valuable information to 
policymakers and educators on how local and state charter school policies and contexts are 
influencing teachers and students.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea of school choice was developed in the 1950s by economist Milton Friedman. 
Friedman believed that poor student performance resulted from forcing schools to be democratic 
institutions. He argued that the government should fund the U.S. school system but not retain 
control over schools. In other words, the government should abandon the rules and regulations 
restricting traditional public schools (TPSs). Instead, Friedman proposed that school choice 
would fix the public school system because it would allow students to attend their chosen school 
and lead to a variety of new schools. Friedman predicted that vouchers would encourage the 
development and improvement of schools through market competition. Thus, Friedman claimed, 
school vouchers would not only increase student achievement but also force complacent and 
failing public schools to improve. Otherwise, these TPSs would be in danger of losing their best 
and brightest students. From Friedman’s perspective, school choice could only increase student 
achievement or, at worst, maintain student achievement levels. 
While Milton Friedman developed the idea of school choice, it did not become a popular 
policy solution until John Chubb’s and Terry Moe’s Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools. 
This classic study analyzed 1980s educational reforms and concluded that low student 
performance should not be blamed on schools. Similar to Friedman, Chubb and Moe believed 
school choice would increase competition among schools, and in turn, this competition would 
increase all students’ academic achievement. Since Chubb and Moe first published their study in 
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1990, charter schools, a form of school choice, have become an increasingly popular alternative 
to TPSs.  
This dissertation evaluates the differences between charter schools and traditional public 
schools (TPSs) and how these differences influence teachers and students. The first essay 
evaluates student achievement in charter schools and TPSs and suggests that causal claims about 
the effect of charter schools on student achievement may be unwarranted.  In the second essay, I 
look beyond student achievement and extend my analysis to evaluate whether charter schools are 
influencing student’s behavioral outcomes. Specifically, I determine whether attending charter 
schools affects students’ number of absences, tardies, in-school suspensions, and out-of-school 
suspensions. Interestingly, while the findings on student achievement are complex and show 
evidence of causal heterogeneity, my results regarding charter schools influence on student 
behavioral outcomes are more straightforward; overall, attending a charter school is associated 
with better behavioral outcomes. Finally, the third essay examines whether charter schools are 
attracting and retaining more effective teachers than traditional public schools. In sum, this three 
essay dissertation provides valuable information to policymakers and educators on how local and 
state charter school policies and contexts are influencing teachers and students.  
Essay One 
Past research shows that North Carolina charter schools have a negative effect on student 
achievement. Disentangling the effects of charter schools from background student 
characteristics is complex and makes it difficult to support causal claims. Results from this study 
demonstrate how different estimation methods lead to different and even opposing conclusions. 
Student fixed effects models showed charter schools have a large negative effect on student 
achievement. Student random effects models estimated no effect of charter schools in math 
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achievement and a small, positive effect in reading achievement. Lastly, I demonstrate that, 
using multilevel growth models, charter schools have a positive effect on both math and reading 
achievement. Finally, examining different subpopulations of charter school students and of 
switchers demonstrates the prevalence of selection bias in estimating charter school effects. 
These findings suggest that causal claims about the effects of charter schools on achievement 
may be undeserved.  
Essay Two  
While results regarding the effects of charter schools on student achievement have been, 
overall, inconclusive, little research has examined the effects of charter schools on behavioral 
outcomes despite their importance in determining students’ future success. This study examines 
whether charter schools influence students’ behavioral outcomes and uses data from 2006 to 
2009 in North Carolina. The results show that relative to charter school only students, switchers 
were negatively selected on a wide array of observable characteristics. Yet, charter school 
enrollment is associated with improved behavioral outcomes such as student absences, tardies, 
and suspensions, even after controlling for student demographic characteristics and student fixed 
effects. The positive, marginal association of charter schools increases as students remain in 
charter schools for longer periods of time. 
Essay Three  
There is mounting evidence that teachers are essential to increasing student achievement. 
However, young adults continue to feel ambivalent about joining the profession. Charter schools 
have become a popular alternative to TPSs and are touted as the ideal solution to fixing the US 
education system. Charter schools’ alternative policies are key to attracting and retaining 
effective teachers since they simultaneously give teachers the flexibility to perfect their teaching 
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style while also providing school administrators with the ability to remove ineffective teachers 
and award effective teachers.  This chapter examines whether charter schools are more likely to 
retain effective and high quality teachers than TPSs. Using data from North Carolina, I find that 
high-performing teachers, as measured by value added models, are more likely to remain in their 
schools than low quality teachers. Additionally, despite the significant differences in school 
characteristics among charter and TPSs, there is no difference between charter school and TPS 
teachers in terms of their movement among schools. In other words, charter schools are no better 
at retaining effective teachers than TPSs. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE COMPLEXITY OF ESTIMATING ACADEMIC 
 ACHIEVEMENT IN CHARTER SCHOOLS: EVIDENCE FROM NORTH CAROLINA  
Introduction 
Since charter school legislation was first passed in 1991, charter schools have become a 
popular alternative to traditional public schools (TPSs). Currently, 42 states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted charter school legislation. From 1999 to 2013, the percent of students 
attending charter schools increased from .7 percent to 6.2 percent while the number of operating 
charter schools grew from approximately 1,500 to 6,100 (NCES, 2015). These rates continue to 
increase each year.  
Despite their popularity, charter schools’ effects on student achievement remain 
inconclusive. Some studies conclude that charter schools decrease student achievement (Bifulco 
& Ladd, 2006; Carruthers, 2012; Hanushek et al., 2007; Imberman, 2011; Lauen, Fuller, & 
Dauter, 2015; Lavertu & Witte, 2009). In contrast, other studies find that charter schools increase 
student achievement. (Abdulkadiroglu et al, 2009; Berends, Mendiburo, & Nicotera, 2008; 
Booker et al., 2007; Hoxby & Rockoff, 2005; Hoxby & Murarka, 2009; Solmon & Goldschmidt, 
2004; Solmon, Paark, & Garcia, 2001). Other researchers have reported that charter schools had 
no significant impact on student test scores (Witte et al., 2007; Zimmer et al., 2009). 
 This study estimates the effects of attending a charter school on North Carolina 
elementary and middle school students’ math and reading test scores. I demonstrate the need to 
use caution when interpreting how charter schools affect student achievement due to the inherent 
differences among student entering and exiting charter schools. My analysis begins with 
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estimating a simple form of the education production function using a pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) model, which allows me to control for potentially confounding student 
background characteristics. However, this model incorrectly assumes that the error term is 
independent across student observations. I build upon this model by employing a student fixed 
effects model, which is a commonly favored model when estimating charter school effects from 
observational, longitudinal data. Student fixed effects models provide the most internally valid 
estimates (except for experimental estimates) because they are based solely on within student 
variation. In other words, both observable and unobservable time-invariant characteristics are 
controlled. Its estimates, however, represent only a small, unique subgroup of the charter school 
population. Consequently, I employ student random effects and multilevel growth models (time 
nested within student), which take advantage of the longitudinal qualities of my data and take 
into account the correlation among students over time. These models base estimates on the entire 
TPS and charter school student samples. The growth models provide dramatically different 
findings from the student fixed effects models. Examining the descriptive characteristics of the 
different charter school subpopulations helps to explain these conflicting estimates. Using 
graphical interpretations of these models to compare subsamples of charter school students and 
TPS students demonstrates the inherent challenges faced when attempting to estimate the true 
effect of charter schools on student achievement.  
 The results raise important reservations about the causal status of the effect of charter 
schools on student test scores, an implication discussed more in the conclusion. My results also 
help explain why there have been a range of estimates when examining charter school student 
achievement. Finally, I discuss the implications my analysis has on policy and research design 
when estimating charter school effects. 
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Background  
Theoretical Considerations 
Charter schools are one of the many forms of school choice that decentralize public 
education. Unlike TPSs, students at charter schools do not have to reside in a certain district or 
neighborhood to be eligible to attend and are not subject to the same rules and regulations as 
TPSs, but the schools still receive public funding. Additionally, these schools can receive 
financial support from donors or other charitable organizations. Of course, charter schools must 
still follow some basic regulations in order to ensure that they increase student achievement 
(Henig, 2008).  
Two major theories of action, local control and market forces, are used to explain why and 
how charter schools have the potential to improve the quality of the U.S. education system 
(Lubienski, 2003). The local control theory posits that giving local leaders, parents, and other 
community members control of their educational system allows schools to break away from the 
stifling and unproductive bureaucracy. Shifting the control of schools to local individuals makes 
them better able to effectively respond to the needs and demands of their community members; 
in other words, proponents of charter schools are “cultural relativists” that create schools to meet 
the specific needs of a particular community (Fuller et al., 2004). Of course, underlying the basic 
principles of local control theory is the assumption that all stakeholders’ sense of mission will 
drive them to create and develop better schools. This is not always the case as past research has 
delineated between two types of charter school founders; there are those who are market-oriented 
and those who are mission-oriented (Henig et al., 2005). 
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Market theory, in contrast, posits that competition for clients drives organizations to provide 
quality products. When applied to the education system, market theory suggests that charter 
schools compete for students by providing a quality education since they cannot compete on 
price. Supporters of this theory propose that poor student performance results from forcing 
schools to be democratic, noncompetitive organizations (Chubb & Moe, 1990). In other words, 
the government’s restrictive rules and regulations governing schools make them ineffective in 
providing a quality education. As a form of school choice, charter schools “stimulate the 
development and improvement” of schools through market competition (Friedman, 1962; Chubb 
& Moe, 1990). Again, this theory relies on the assumption that parents and other interested 
parties are receiving free and reliable information on the relative quality of schools.  
Background on North Carolina Charter Schools  
 North Carolina adopted charter school legislation in 1996, with the first 34 charter 
schools opening for the 1997-1998 school year. After lifting the 100 charter school cap in 2011, 
the number of charter schools operating in North Carolina grew to 148 for the 2014-2015 school 
year. Additionally, charter school enrollment continues to increase each year while an additional 
32,000 students remain waitlisted (NCDPI, 2015; NCAlliance, 2015). 
Charter schools in North Carolina are exempt from following several operational and funding 
regulations governing TPSs. Instead, a charter school’s board of directors is in charge of the 
budget, curriculum, and other operational activities. For example, the school board is not 
required to provide transportation or meals to students, even students in free and reduced lunch 
programs. Additionally, teachers at charter schools do not have to be licensed; fifty percent of 
middle and high school teachers can be unlicensed and 25 percent of elementary school teachers 
can be unlicensed. In terms of funding, charter schools receive the average per-pupil allocation 
9 
including additional funding for special needs and LEP students. However, charter schools are 
not eligible to receive capital funding and cannot use state funds to buy real property (Office of 
Charter Schools, 2015). 
Past Literature on Charter School Student Achievement 
Several studies have examined the effect of charter schools on student achievement, at the 
local, state, and national level. Results have, overall, been inconclusive. At the national level, 
one study including data from 26 states found that most charter schools did not significantly 
affect students’ math achievement (40%) or reading achievement (56%), although two 
subgroups, LEP Latinos and black students from low socioeconomic backgrounds, greatly 
benefited from attending charter schools. Approximately equal numbers of charter school 
students had lower (31%) and higher (29%) test scores in math. Slightly more charter school 
students had lower test scores in reading (25% vs. 19%; CREDO, 2013). 
Studies using lottery systems to estimate charter school effects in Chicago, New York City, 
and Boston have, overall, shown improvement in student test scores (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 
2011; Hoxby & Murarka, 2009; Hoxby & Rockoff, 2005). When charter schools are 
oversubscribed, schools accept students based on a randomized lottery system. Using a lottery 
system provides strong internally valid results since students will be more adequately matched in 
terms of unobservable confounds. However, external validity is weakened since estimates are 
based only on students who want to attend charter schools (as opposed to all other students in 
TPSs).  
Several charter school studies using longitudinal observational data employ student fixed 
effects models to estimate charter school effects (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Carruthers, 2012; 
Imberman, 2011; Lavertu & Witte, 2009; Sass, 2006; Zimmer et al., 2009). These estimates can 
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be considered causal, assuming that time-variant observables are included in the model, since the 
need to control for time-invariant observables and unobservables is eliminated. External validity, 
however, is a key issue since student fixed effects estimates are based solely on switchers, or 
students who switch from charter schools to TPSs and vice versa.  
Among studies using student fixed effects models, results have been mixed. In Florida, Sass 
(2006) showed that charter schools have a negative effect on achievement. However, after their 
fifth year of operation, there was a significant positive effect on reading test scores.  In 
Wisconsin, the opposite results were found using student fixed effects: charter schools had no 
effect on reading achievement but a positive effect on math achievement (Lavertu & Witte, 
2009). These differences suggest that effects of charter schools may vary across school systems 
and states.  
Recently, charter school studies have started using multilevel growth models, a type of 
student random effects model to estimate test score growth (Berends et al., 2009; Lauen, Fuller, 
& Dauter, 2015; Zimmer at al., 2009). These models allow for estimates to be based on the entire 
charter school and TPS student samples and build on student random effects models by 
permitting both random slopes and intercepts. At the same time, these studies continue to face 
non-random assignment issues and must control for both student time-variant and time-invariant 
confounds.  
Studies using multilevel growth models have also found a variety of charter school effects. In 
an unknown urban school district, Berends and his colleagues (2008) found that charter schools 
increased test scores after an initial drop during students’ first years in charter schools. In 
California, reading and math test score growth was lower in elementary charter schools than 
TPSs (Lauen, Fuller, & Dauter, 2015; Zimmer et al., 2009).  
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Past Literature on North Carolina Charter Schools Student Achievement 
Two studies conducted in North Carolina found that charter schools on average lower student 
math and reading test scores. (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Carruthers, 2012). Bifulco and Ladd (2006) 
used data on students in North Carolina’s public school system between the years of 1996 and 
2002 in grades 3 through 8. Using levels, gains, and student fixed effects models, Bifulco and 
Ladd (2006) showed that charter school students’ achievement was significantly lower than TPS 
student achievement. Charter school students’ reading and math test scores were .095 and .160 of 
a standard deviation lower than TPSs when estimated using student fixed effects. Bifulco and 
Ladd (2006) suggest that their estimates using student fixed effects are representative of the 
larger charter school population by comparing students observed in both charter and TPSs to 
students observed at least once in a charter school and showing that they were demographically 
similar groups in terms of race and parent education.  
Carruthers (2012) analyzed charter school effects in North Carolina from 1996 to 2002 in 
grades 7 and 8. Carruthers (2012) employed two versions of the student fixed effects model. In 
the first version, the outcome variable was students’ standardized test scores, otherwise known as 
a levels dependent variable. This model determined that charter schools had a positive effect on 
both math and reading student test scores. The other version used a gains dependent variable, 
which represents the difference in students’ test scores from one year to the next. In contrast to 
the levels model, the gains model shows a negative effect from charter schools on math 
achievement and a positive effect on reading achievement. Lastly, Carruthers (2012) employs a 
dynamic panel data (DPD) model which uses students’ past test scores as an instrumental 
variable. Carruthers (2012) points out that the major issue with this model is that it limits her 
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analysis to a small sample of the data since students must have at least three lagged test scores to 
be included in the DPD model. Results show that math test scores are .016 of a standard 
deviation lower while reading test scores are .001 of a standard deviation higher in charter 
schools.  
Data and Measures 
Data 
My sample includes elementary school and middle school TPS and charter school 
students in grades 4-8 between the years of 2004 and 2011. Approximately 3.9 million 
observations of 1.3 million students, including 44,000 charter school students, were included in 
my analytic sample.1 My analysis focuses on the most recent data available in North Carolina. 
Previous research on North Carolina’s charter schools used data up to 2002 (Bifulco & Ladd, 
2006) and 2007 (Carruthers, 2012). 
I used data from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI) 
administrative records. These data are maintained by the North Carolina Education Research 
Data Center and includes information on all TPS and charter school students in grade 3 through 
12 in North Carolina. Information on teachers, classrooms, schools, and districts are also 
available. Students are longitudinally linked and therefore can be followed from year to year.  
To increase the internal validity of my results, the scores of students whose tests were 
incorrectly administered were omitted from analysis and replaced with their correctly 
administered test. Additionally, students with the same identification number in the same year 
were dropped since there was no basis for determining which identification number identified the 
correct student. To be kept in this analysis, students had to have at least one lagged test score to 
                                                 
1These statistics refer specifically to the math sample. 
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control for prior educational inputs. Therefore, students in grade 3 were omitted. Students with 
missing data on dependent or independent variables were dropped. 
Measures 
Achievement. My dependent variables of interest were students’ end-of-grade (EOG) 
math and reading tests scores. From grades 3 to 8, all students are required to take math and 
reading multiple choice tests at the end of the school year to evaluate their academic 
competencies as described in the North Carolina Standard Course of Study. Scores should 
increase as students move through each grade. If students’ scores do not improve, charter schools 
risk being shut down. To make scores comparable, students’ raw scores are standardized (i.e. the 
mean becomes 0 and the standard deviation becomes 1) for each year and grade combination. 
Other indicators of achievement, such as college enrollment, are less suitable since it may not be 
one of the charter school’s primary objectives.  
 Charter School Indicator. My main covariate of interest indicated if a student attended a 
charter school and is time-varying (1=yes, 0=no). 
Additional Controls. Time-variant and -invariant covariates were included in my analysis. 
Time-invariant covariates included race and gender (male=0, female=1). Race consisted of five 
categories including black, Asian, Hispanic, Native American, and multiracial, with white being 
the reference category.  
Time-variant covariates included dummy variables of LEP status, disability status, free or 
reduced price lunch, academic giftedness in math and reading, and retention. A student was 
considered learning disabled if he or she was labeled as having a deficiency in one of 4 areas: 
reading, writing, math, or other. Additionally, indicators of structural change and non-structural 
change, with no change being the reference category, were included. A structural move is 
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defined as a situation in which a student and at least 30 percent of those in his or her same grade 
and school move together to another school (Carruthers, 2012; Sass, 2006). In other words, a 
structural move is made if a student moves from elementary school to middle school. A non-
structural move indicates if a student changed schools during elementary or during middle 
school. Lastly, models included grade and grade squared to control for time.  
Methods  
I begin my analysis by estimating a simple valued-added model (VAM) of the education 
production function. VAMs assume that prior inputs can be summarized by students’ lagged test 
scores (Todd & Wolpin, 2003; Todd & Wolpin, 2007). This inherently introduces endogeneity 
bias into the model since prior inputs most likely influence current inputs. 
The general model includes a once lagged test score, Yti-1, on the right hand side of the 
equation and is used instead of a gains score model, which places the lagged test score on the left 
hand side. Gains score models assume that the coefficient on lagged test scores is equal to one. 
In other words, this assumes that the lagged test score is a perfect representation of students’ 
prior inputs and achievement and that there is no decay effect (Todd & Wolpin, 2003). 
Using ordinary least squares (OLS), my model is:  
 
(1) Yti = β0 + β1Yti-1 + β2Charterti + β3Gradeti + β4Grade2ti + β5XTti + β6Xi + ti. 
 
This model regresses math or reading standardized test scores, Y, at time t for student i on a 
charter indicator, grade level, grade squared, once lagged achievement, a vector of time-variant 
covariates (XT), and time-invariant covariates (X). Pooled OLS models assume that the error 
term, ti, is independent across observations. Additionally, to obtain accurate estimates, this 
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model assumes that all potentially confounding time-variant and time-invariant variables 
between the charter school indicator and the outcome variable, standardized math or reading test 
score, are included. 
Student Fixed Effects Model 
In most models estimating charter school effects, the main problem encountered is 
controlling for unobservable student confounds. Consequently, student fixed effects models are 
commonly employed, which controls for time-invariant unobservables, such as innate ability, 
and time-invariant observables:  
 
(2) Yti = β0 + β1Yti-1 + β2Charterti + β3Gradeti + β4Grade2ti + β5XTti + i  + ti 
 
Student fixed effects allow each student to have his or her own deviation, i, from the mean 
intercept, β0; therefore, students are compared only to their own baseline. Using student fixed 
effects accounts for all student time-invariant confounds, such as innate ability and prior inputs, 
since only within student estimates are computed. Consequently, there is no need to control for 
both observed and unobserved time-invariant student confounds since students are only being 
compared to themselves. Unlike equation (1), equation (2) does not require a vector of time-
invariant covariates, Xi. These estimates, however, may still be biased due to time-variant 
covariates (XTti), which continue to be included in the model.   
The student fixed effects model is relatively inefficient (i.e. leads to larger standard 
errors) and requires within-student variation (about 2% of my sample) because student fixed 
effects estimates are only based on switchers. Consequently, this model has less external validity.   
 
16 
Student Random Effects  
When using longitudinal data, OLS is found to be inefficient and biased. To take advantage 
of the longitudinal aspects of this data, I employ the more efficient student random effects model 
which allows for within unit correlations or the clustering of students’ errors. Random effects 
models use precision-weighted least-squares estimates that compute both between effects and 
fixed effects and provide the weighted average of these two results: 
 
(3) Yti = β0 + β1Yti-1 + β2Charterti + β3Gradeti + β4Grade2ti + β5XTti + β6Xi + ti + u0i. 
 
In this model, the additional term, u0i, estimates a student’s time-invariant error term while ti 
accounts for a student’s time-varying residual. In contrast to pooled OLS, student random effects 
allows each individual to have his or her own random intercept. Similar to the pooled OLS 
model, to obtain accurate estimates, all potentially confounding time-variant (XT) and time-
invariant (X) covariates must be controlled.  
Multilevel Growth Models  
Lastly, non-linear multilevel (time nested within student) growth models, a type of 
random effects model, are estimated. Like other random effects models, both between and within 
variance are used to estimate effects which make this model more efficient than fixed effects 
models that only use within variance to estimate coefficients. Additionally, these models allow 
estimates for non-linear growth trajectories:  
 
(4) Yti = β0 + β1Charterti + β2XTti + β3Xi+ β4Gradeti + β5Grade2ti+ β6Gradeti x Charterti + 
β7Grade2ti x Charterti + u0i + u1jGradeti + u2jGrade2ti+ u3jXTti  + u4jXi + ti 
17 
 
Both time-variant (XTti) and time-invariant (XTi) covariates are included. Unlike the previously 
mentioned random effects model used, this multilevel growth model allows both slopes and 
intercepts to vary randomly. The time variable, Gradeti (and consequently, Grade
2
ti), are set to 0 
(instead of grade 4) to define initial status. β6 is the coefficient of interest and demonstrates the 
average effect of attending a charter school on students’ tests scores across all grade levels. I also 
include a squared time variable, Grade2ti, which allows the effects to be non-linear. By including 
this covariate, there is no assumption made that the average effect of attending a charter school 
must be the same across all grade levels.  
Estimates are unbiased and efficient if the covariates are uncorrelated with attending a 
charter school; in other words, all possibly confounding variables are controlled so that attending 
a charter school is exogenously determined.  
Comparing the effects of charter schools estimated from the student fixed effects model 
to the student random effects model leads to vastly different conclusions regarding charter 
schools. Using the preferred multilevel growth model since it allows both slopes and intercepts 
to vary as well as allows me to include both time-variant and time-invariant confounds helps to 
explain the these different findings. To further explore these results, I ran additional growth 
models on subsamples of charter school students. Specifically, I compare the growth trajectories 
among students observed only in TPSs to students observed only in charter schools, students 
who switched into charter schools, students who switched out of charter schools, and finally, 
students who switched schools multiple times.  
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Results  
In general, charter schools seem to have slightly better characteristics than TPSs (Table 
2.1). Charter schools enroll fewer students (352 vs. 545), have less crime per 100 students (.26 
vs. .63), and are less likely to be a Title I School (42% vs. 62%). Similar proportions of white 
students (54%) attend each school type although a higher proportion of black students attend 
charter schools (37% vs. 31%) while a higher proportion of Latinos attend TPSs (10% vs. 4%). 
Finally, most charter schools are situated in urban areas (39%) while most TPSs are located in 
rural areas (48%).  
Examining the descriptive statistics of my student sample among students observed only 
in TPSs, those observed only in charter schools, and switchers illustrates that students observed 
only in charter schools appear to have better more affluent characteristics compared to switchers 
(Table 2.2). Demographically, charter school students are more likely to be white (69% vs. 50%) 
and less likely to enroll in free or reduced price lunch programs (19% vs. 37%) than switchers. 
Switchers are more likely to be black (37% vs. 22%) and are more likely to be retained (2% vs. 
1%). Switchers do not appear to represent the majority of charter school students. 
Even among switchers, a few distinct trends differentiate students that switch into charter 
schools, switch out of charter schools, and switch multiple times (Table 2.3). Those who switch 
into charter schools are more likely to be white (61%). Multiple switchers and those switching 
out are more likely to enroll in a free or reduced price lunch program (50% and 40%, 
respectively), are more likely to be retained (3% and 2%, respectively), to have a disability (6% 
and 6%, respectively), and are less likely to be white (41% and 51%, respectively). Students 
selecting into charter schools have more affluent background characteristics when compared to 
multiple switchers and those switching out of charter schools. 
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The student fixed effects model estimates that charter schools have a large and 
statistically significant negative effect on math and reading test scores (Table 2.4).2 Attending a 
charter school is associated with a .13 decrease in students’ standardized math test scores and a 
.05 decrease in students’ reading standardized test scores compared to TPS students. However, 
student fixed effects models only use switchers to compute estimates, and switchers represent 
approximately 2% of students and do not represent the majority of charter schools students. 
For both the math and reading outcomes, the pooled OLS and student random effects 
models provide similar estimates (Table 2.4). For the math sample, charter schools have no 
significant effect on achievement in either the pooled OLS or student random effects model. For 
the reading sample, charter schools have the same positive and statistically significant effect on 
student test scores compared to TPSs in the pooled OLS and student random effects models. 
Attending a charter school is associated with, on average, a .04 increase in a student’s 
standardized reading test score compared to a TPS student.  
The non-linear time-nested within-student random coefficient growth models provide a 
more optimistic picture of student achievement in charter schools and start to provide some 
explanation for the conflicting results discussed above (Table 2.5).3 Charter school students in 
4th grade start behind their TPS peers in both math and reading, as shown by the negative and 
statistically significant charter school coefficient. However, the interaction effect between charter 
school and grade shows that charter school students’ positive trajectory is significantly larger 
compared to TPS students; students in charter schools have on average a .07 increase in their 
                                                 
2Including grade-year fixed effects models provided similar results to the quadratic time models. 
 
3Linear growth models were also run and provided similar results to non-linear models (see Appendix Table A1). 
However, the non-linear growth models are presented in order to depict a more nuanced picture of the effects of 
charter schools on student achievement. 
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math standardized test scores and .04 increase in the growth of their reading standardized test 
scores compared to TPS students. The effect of charter schools slightly decreases when including 
the interaction effect between grade squared and charter for the math sample, although not 
enough to negate the overall positive trajectory of charter school test score growth. The 
interaction term of grade squared and charter has no effect on reading achievement.   
The results from the multilevel growth model are best understood by examining test score 
growth trajectories graphically (Figure 2.1 and 2.2). For both math and reading, charter school 
students have a positive growth trajectory, while TPS student growth is relatively constant. In 
both the math and reading samples, charter school student achievement eventually surpasses TPS 
student achievement.   
Results by Switcher Type 
I ran additional multilevel models on subgroups of charter school students (Figure 2.3-
2.6). Almost none of the slopes of the charter school subgroups were negative. Not surprisingly, 
students only observed in charter schools had the largest positive growth trajectory (Figure 2.3). 
However, the most revealing results came from examining the varying trajectories of each 
switcher group. In models used to compare, first, TPS only students and students who switched 
into charter schools, and second, TPS only students and students who switched schools multiple 
times, the trajectories of the subsets of charter school students initially increased before gradually 
leveling out (Figures 2.4 and 2.6, respectively). Examining the results of the sample of TPS only 
students and those who switched out of charter schools, charter schools students experienced a 
positive growth trajectory while those in TPS experience a negative growth trajectory (Figure 
2.5). Compared to the negative growth trajectory of TPS only students, the subgroups of charter 
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school students have, in general, positive growth trajectories although these trajectories still vary 
depending on the subgroup.4 
Discussion 
My study makes several contributions to the existing literature on charter schools 
including explaining how past research on charter school student achievement has drawn such a 
wide range of conclusions. Additionally, my present findings challenge previous literature in 
North Carolina that employed student fixed effects models and found that charter schools 
decreased student achievement. Specifically, I show that these results were based solely on a 
small, unique subpopulation of charter school students. Compared to charter school only 
students, switchers were from less advantaged backgrounds. While these results have strong 
internal validity, switchers did not appear to be representative of charter school students in 
general. These results potentially suggest a story of causal heterogeneity, which was further 
confirmed by the results from the student random effect models. The random effects model 
provided substantially different findings. Attending charter schools did not significantly increase 
students’ math test scores compared to students attending a TPS. Charter schools were associated 
with an increase in reading standardized tests scores. Random effects models account for the 
whole student population and provide vastly different results from the student fixed effects 
models. Combined with the student fixed effects model results, these findings are indicative of 
causal heterogeneity.  
Growth models, my preferred model, show that charter schools are actually associated 
with a positive trajectory in students’ math and reading achievement. Further analysis with these 
models shows that, in general, the positive trajectories of the subgroups of charter school 
                                                 
4These figures specifically refer to the math sample. Similar results are found in the reading sample. 
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students still substantially vary. For example, charter school only students from more affluent 
backgrounds had the largest positive trajectories in student achievement. In contrast, student 
from the poorest backgrounds such as students who switched schools multiple times and those 
who switched out of charter schools still benefitted from charter schools but to a lesser degree. 
Students who switched out of charter schools have a much gentler upward slope whereas 
multiple switchers initially benefit from attending a charter school but eventually regress. These 
findings suggest that student fixed effects and random effects models are not capturing the true 
effect of charter schools; instead, causal heterogeneity may be the driving force behind these 
different estimations. Consequently, causal claims on effect of charter schools on student 
achievement should be interpreted cautiously; estimations appear to be dependent on the specific 
population of charter school students on which parameters are being estimated. 
This study is not without its limitations. First, my results are based on the student 
population in North Carolina and therefore limits the generalizability of my findings, especially 
since the rules and policies regarding charter schools varies from one state to the next. Second, as 
with any study on charter school student achievement, omitted variable bias is always a potential 
concern. However, the research design used in this study substantially reduces bias from time-
variant and time-invariant covariates. Future work should continue to hypothesize and quantify 
covariates that may predict students’ standardized test scores. 
 Despite the large number of studies evaluating charter school student achievement, more 
research is needed to garner the true effects of charter schools. These effects cannot be 
determined solely with research designs using lotteries to evaluate charter schools since these 
designs will fall prey to issues associated with causal heterogeneity. Future studies should 
examine the specific effects that charter schools have on student achievement of the 
23 
heterogeneous subgroups in charter schools. Research on these particular groups will help 
delineate which students in charter schools will benefit most from attending them.    
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Fig 2.2 Average Reading Test Score Growth, Full Sample
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Figure 2.3 Average Math Test Score Growth, TPS only vs Charter only
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Table 2.1 North Carolina School Descriptives (2004-2011)
%/mean SD %/mean SD
Average Enrollment 545 262 352 270
% Female 48% 0.05 49% 0.05
Title I School 64% 0.48 42% 0.49
Crimes per 100 Students 0.63 1.98 0.26 1.10
Ethnic Composition 
% Black 31% 0.25 37% 0.36
% Latino 10% 0.10 4% 0.06
% White 54% 0.28 54% 0.36
Location 
Urban 25% 0.43 39% 0.49
Suburban 15% 0.36 12% 0.32
Town 12% 0.33 16% 0.36
Rural 48% 0.50 33% 0.47
Observations (school-years) 14514 666
Traditional Public 
Schools Charter Schools
Note: Averages may be slightly skewed for certain variables since data was missing on a 
few schools. Less than 1% of data was missing on any one variable reported.  
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%/mean SD %/mean SD %/mean SD %/mean SD
Math Std. Test Score 0.03 (0.99) 0.03 (0.99) 0.22 (0.96) -0.10 (1.01)
Math Gain 0.00 (0.56) 0.00 (0.56) 0.03 (0.55) 0.00 (0.59)
Reading Std. Test Score 0.02 (0.99) 0.02 (0.99) 0.27 (0.97) -0.03 (1.02)
Reading Gain -0.01 (0.60) -0.01 (0.60) 0.02 (0.59) 0.00 (0.62)
Free/Reduced Price Lunch 0.47 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) 0.19 (0.39) 0.37 (0.48)
Retention 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.09) 0.02 (0.14)
Limited English Proficient 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12)
Disability Status 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.23) 0.05 (0.23)
Academic Giftedness in 
Math 0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35) 0.02 (0.15) 0.06 (0.24)
Academic Giftedness in 
Reading 0.13 (0.34) 0.14 (0.34) 0.03 (0.16) 0.06 (0.25)
Female 0.50 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50)
Race 
Asian 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.10)
Black 0.27 (0.45) 0.27 (0.44) 0.22 (0.41) 0.37 (0.48)
Hispanic 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.28) 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.17)
American Indian 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.10) 0.02 (0.14)
Multiracial 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.16) 0.04 (0.19)
White 0.58 (0.49) 0.58 (0.49) 0.69 (0.46) 0.53 (0.50)
Observations (student-
years)
Notes: EOG test scores were standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 by grade and year. Test 
scores refer to students' baseline test scores in 4th grade (N= 778799) for the math sample and (N=773874) for the 
reading sample. Student-years refers to the math sample although the means and standard deviations for reading 
standardized test score, reading gain, and academic giftedness in reading are from the reading sample (N=3843599).  
Full Sample
3861493
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of North Carolina Students (Grades 4-8, 2004-11)
Always Observed 
in TPS
Always Observed 
in Charter Switchers
3712110 49910 99473
32 
 
  
%/mean SD %/mean SD %/mean SD
Math Std. Test Score 0.12 (1.00) -0.28 (0.98) -0.33 (0.97)
Math Gain -0.02 (0.57) 0.05 (0.60) -0.02 (0.61)
Reading Std. Test Score 0.19 (0.96) -0.19 (1.00) -0.20 (0.98)
Reading Gain -0.01 (0.60) 0.03 (0.64) -0.02 (0.65)
Free/Reduced Price Lunch 0.29 (0.45) 0.40 (0.49) 0.50 (0.50)
Retention 0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.15) 0.03 (0.17)
Limited English Proficient 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11)
Disability Status 0.05 (0.21) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.23)
Academic Giftedness in Math 0.08 (0.27) 0.06 (0.24) 0.04 (0.20)
Academic Giftedness in Reading 0.08 (0.27) 0.06 (0.24) 0.04 (0.20)
Female 0.52 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50)
Race 
Asian 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.08)
Black 0.29 (0.45) 0.41 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50)
Hispanic 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.18)
American Indian 0.02 (0.14) 0.01 (0.11) 0.03 (0.17)
Multiracial 0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.19) 0.05 (0.21)
White 0.61 (0.49) 0.51 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49)
Observations (student-years)
Notes: EOG test scores were standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
1 by grade and year. Test scores refer to students' baseline test scores in 4th grade (N= 
778799) for the math sample and (N=773874) for the reading sample. Student-years 
refers to the math sample although the means and standard deviations for reading 
standardized test score, reading gain, and academic giftedness in reading are from the 
reading sample (N=3843599). Indicates statistical differences (p<.05) between the sample 
means: a=conversion vs. TPS, b=start-up vs. TPS, and c=conversion vs. start-up.  
3228843695 23490
Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics of Switchers (Grades 4-8, 2004-2011)
Switched In 
and Out of 
Charter
Switch In 
Charter and 
Stayed In
Switched Out 
of Charter and 
Stayed Out
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Coef. Coef.
Charter School -0.14 (0.00) *** -0.03 (0.00) ***
Grade -0.01 (0.00) *** -0.02 (0.00) ***
Charter School X Grade 0.07 (0.00) *** 0.04 (0.00) ***
Grade X Grade 0.00 (0.00) * 0.00 (0.00) ***
Charter School X Grade X Grade -0.01 (0.00) *** 0.00 (0.00)
Structural Change 
Non-Structural Change -0.05 (0.00) *** -0.03 (0.00) ***
Structural Change -0.08 (0.00) *** -0.05 (0.00) ***
No Change (ref.)
Demographics
Female -0.03 (0.00) *** 0.13 (0.00) ***
Free/Reduced Price Lunch -0.17 (0.00) *** -0.19 (0.00) ***
Retention 0.25 (0.01) *** 0.18 (0.01) ***
Limited English Proficient -0.40 (0.00) *** -0.54 (0.00) ***
Disability Status -0.27 (0.00) *** -0.45 (0.00) ***
Academic Giftedness 0.55 (0.00) *** 0.52 (0.00) ***
Race 
Asian 0.32 (0.01) *** 0.10 (0.01) ***
Black -0.66 (0.00) *** -0.60 (0.00) ***
Hispanic -0.20 (0.00) *** -0.28 (0.00) ***
American Indian -0.53 (0.01) *** -0.53 (0.01) ***
Multiracial -0.24 (0.00) *** -0.21 (0.00) ***
White (ref.)
Observations (student-years)
Note: Grade recentered at 0. Models include interactions between  student demographic 
controls and grade and grade squared. Robust SEs in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 5% level       **Statistically significant at the 1% level       
***Statistically significant at the .1% level 
Table 2.5 Non-Linear Multilevel Growth Models, 2004-2011
Math Standardized 
Test Score 
Reading Standardized 
Test Score
SE SE
3861493 3843599
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CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECT OF CHARTER SCHOOLS  
ON BEHAVIORAL OUTCOMES: EVIDENCE FROM NORTH CAROLINA 
Introduction 
Since 1991, 42 states and the District of Columbia have adopted charter school legislation. 
Charter schools serve more than 2.5 million children (National Alliance for Public Charter 
Schools, 2015) in approximately 6,100 schools across the U.S. (NCES, 2015), and these rates 
increase annually. Additionally, charter schools continue to garner support from both parents and 
students (Barrett, 2003; Buckley & Schneider, 2009; Gleason et al., 2010; McCully & Malin, 
2003). In a multi-state study, parents of charter school students were 33% more likely to rate 
their school as excellent compared to parents of traditional public school (TPS) students. 
However, charter schools’ high ratings were not necessarily due to increases in student 
achievement. Rather, parents cited the stricter and more disciplined environments of charter 
schools as one of the primary reasons that they were satisfied with their child’s charter school 
(Gleason et al., 2010).  
While there is a substantial amount of research exploring the effects of charter schools on 
student achievement, few studies have examined the effects of charter schools on students’ 
behavioral outcomes despite their importance in determining students’ future success.  For 
example, self-discipline has been shown to predict students’ grades, standardized test scores, and 
hours spent on homework (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005, 2006). Additionally, wages, work 
experience, and other life outcomes have been directly related to students’ behavioral outcomes 
(Heckman, Stixrud, & Urzua, 2006; Heckman & Rubinstein, 2001). Indeed previous research has 
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even suggested that behavioral skills better explain differences in wages than cognitive skills 
(Bowles & Ginits, 1976; Bowles, Gintis, & Osborne, 2001; Carneiro, Heckman, & Masterov, 
2005). These results suggest that the development of adolescents’ behavioral skills are just as 
essential, if not more so, than the development of their cognitive skills. 
Using data from North Carolina, this study examines whether charter schools influence 
students’ behavioral outcomes. Few studies have looked at students’ behavioral and non-
cognitive development (Dobbie & Fryer, 2013; Imberman, 2011). This study contributes to the 
existing literature on charter schools by examining a largely overlooked dimension of student 
outcomes on which to evaluate the success of charter schools. Benefits of charter schools on 
students’ behavioral outcomes may explain the positive externalities (i.e. non-cognitive skills) 
associated with charter schools as well as why more charter school students are graduating from 
high school and attending college (Angrist et al., 2013).  
Theoretical Considerations 
As one of the many forms of school choice, charter schools developed as a way to 
decentralize public education. Both charter and TPSs receive public funding. However, charter 
schools can receive financial support from donors or other charitable organizations. Additionally, 
charter school students do not have to reside in a certain district or neighborhood to be eligible to 
attend and are not subject to the same rules and regulations as TPSs (Henig, 2005). In North 
Carolina, a charter school’s board of directors is in charge of the budget, curriculum, and other 
operational activities. For example, the school board is not required to provide transportation or 
meals to students, even students who qualify for free and reduced lunch programs.   
Market theory and institutional theory help explain how and why charter schools may affect 
student outcomes, including students’ behavioral outcomes. Market theory posits that, in general, 
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competition and choice drive producers to offer higher quality products. Applying this logic to 
the U.S. education system, market theorists propose that allowing students to choose the school 
they want to attend and making schools compete for students leads to better, higher quality 
education (Betts & Loveless, 2005; Bulkley & Wohlstetter, 2004; Chubb & Moe, 1990). In 
contrast, highly regulated and systematized TPSs have little incentive to improve or maintain a 
certain standard of quality (Chubb & Moe, 1990). Allowing charter schools to be deregulated 
and decentralized provides them with the autonomy to improve student outcomes. Specifically, 
charter schools are able to rapidly respond to the needs and preferences of their community by 
adopting innovative practices (Bulkley & Wohlstetter, 2004; Vieteritti, 1999).  
Milton Friedman and Gary Becker both claimed that choice and competition “would 
induce a fast rate of innovation” in schools (Becker, 1999, p. 2; Friedman, 1955; Chubb & Moe, 
1990; Coulson, 1999; Friedman & Friedman, 1980; Gintis, 1995; Lubienski, 2005). Charter 
schools compete for students and consequently, stay focused on the needs of the consumers (i.e. 
students and families), facilitating a rapid rate of innovation in teaching and education. These 
instructional, curricular, and adminstrative changes are directed at improving students’ well-
being (Lubienski, 2005).  
Students’ well-being and ultimate success undoubtedly includes behavioral outcomes. 
Indeed, in Lubienski’s (2003) literature review of innovative standards adopted by charter 
schools, many new practices are related to organizational activities and not necessarily directly 
related to student achievement in the classroom. For example, several charter schools focus on 
instilling shared community values, such as the value of receiving an education (Strike, 2010).  
In contrast to market theory, institutional theory suggests that charter schools will not be 
markedly different from TPSs. Institutional theory assumes that organizations, such as schools, 
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are highly regulated and static (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) due to the overwhelming influence of 
an organization’s history (North, 1990). Consequently, communities with strong values define 
what is considered to be a legitimate school. To be successful, new schools are strongly 
incentivized to adopt similar norms and structures that validate and legitimize existing customs. 
Ultimately, this leads to organizational isomorphism (Meyer & Ramirez, 2000; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977), and suggests that charter schools ultimately revert back to more traditional learning 
systems without innovative practices (Lubienski, 2005).  
These theories provide conflicting hypotheses. According to market theory, innovative 
practices adopted by charter schools should ultimately lead to improving their students’ 
behavioral outcomes. In contrast, institutional theory posits that charter schools would actually 
adopt similar practices and norms of TPSs, and thus, charter school students’ behavioral 
outcomes would be unchanged.  
Background 
Behavioral outcomes 
Research focusing on children’s behavior illustrates its importance on both short- and 
long-term student outcomes (Heckman et al., 2006; Heckman & Rubinstein, 2001). Heckman 
and his colleagues (2006) found that adolescent behavior and non-cognitive abilities influence 
their future degree attainment and wages. In studies comparing the wages of GED-holders to 
high school dropouts, results showed that dropouts actually earned higher wages than GED-
holders after controlling for behaviorial outcomes. This wage differential, in fact, was due to the 
differences in these groups’ behavioral (Cameron & Heckman, 1993; Heckman, Hsse, & 
Rubinstein, 2000).  Similarly, after analyzing the results from 24 studies, Bowles and Gintis 
(2002) determined that the effect of cognitive skills on future earnings is, on average, reduced by 
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18 percent when behaviorial measures are included in their analysis. Improvement in students’ 
behavioral outcomes leads to increases both students’ productivity and earnings by instilling 
students with the correct habits and skills to succeed in the workforce. 
Many studies suggest that behavioral outcomes are reflective of non-cognitive skills. 
(Heckman et al., 2006) Consequently, previous studies have used attendance records and 
suspensions as proxies for measuring non-cognitive skills (Imberman, 2011; Jackson, 2012; 
Segal, 2013). In North Carolina, Jackson (2012) used absences, suspensions, grades, and on-time 
grade progression to measure students’ non-cognitive skill level, and showed that these measures 
were predictive of students’ future arrests, employment, and earnings.  
Charter School Outcomes 
Previous research on charter schools has been particularly focused on examining 
students’ cognitive skills, including test scores, educational attainment, and college enrollment. 
The effects of charter schools on standardized test scores have provided conflicting results. Some 
charter schools have little to no positive effect on their students’ test scores (Abdulkadiroglu et 
al., 2011; Angrist et al, 2010; Booker et al., 2007; Hoxby & Murarka, 2009; Hoxby & Rockoff, 
2004; Sass, 2006; Witte, et al., 2007; Zimmer, et al., 2009). In some cases, studies have even 
found that charter schools lowered student achievement compared to TPS students (Bettinger, 
2005; Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Carruthers, 2012; Zimmer & Buddin, 2006). National studies 
comparing student achievement between charter school and TPS students determined that, after 
controlling for student demographics, charter school student achievement was, in general, no 
different from TPS student achievement (CREDO, 2013; Lubienski & Lubienski, 2006). Most 
recently, a study evaluating data from 26 states determined that while some charter schools are 
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improving test scores, about 19 percent and 31 percent still perform worse than TPSs in reading 
and math, respectively (CREDO, 2013). 
While charter schools may not uniformly improve student test scores, studies evaluating 
other indicators of academic success such as educational attainment have provided more positive 
results (Booker et al., 2009; Booker et al., 2011; Furgeson et al., 2012; Angrist et al., 2013; 
McClure et al., 2005). In San Diego, charter school lottery winners were more likely to report 
plans to attend a 4-year college compared to lottery losers (McClure et al., 2005). Even after 
controlling for demographic characteristics, charter school students are more likely to graduate 
from high school and to attend college than their TPS peers (Booker et al., 2009). On average, 
attending a charter high school increased students’ likelihood of attending college by 8 to 10 
percentage points while attending both a charter middle and high school increased students’ 
chances of going to college by 7 to 15 percentage points (Booker et al., 2011). In a study 
examining charter management organizations, charter students were 21 to 23 percent more likely 
to enroll in college (Furgeson et al., 2012). While some studies have found no significant effects 
of charter schools on educational attainment, they have found positive effects on charter 
students’ transition from a 2-year to 4-year college and on their SAT scores (Angrist et al., 
2013). In general, students attending charter schools have higher educational attainment than 
those in TPSs.  
A few studies have examined the effects of charter schools on behavioral outcomes 
(Dobbie & Fryer, 2013; Imberman 2011). One study found that, in general, students’ attendance 
and discipline improved after transferring from a TPS to a charter school at all grade levels. 
Specifically, Imberman (2011) found that while charter schools did not increase students’ test 
scores, but they did improve students’ absences. Studies of the Harlem Children’s Zone show 
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that female and male students attending the Promise Academy (a charter school) were, 
respectively, 12.1 percentage points less likely to become pregnant and 4.3 percentage points less 
likely to be incarcerated (Dobbie & Fryer, 2013). While there is limited research on charter 
students’ behavioral outcomes, the few studies conducted have shown positive results. I 
contribute to this growing literature by looking specifically at schools in North Carolina, where 
most studies on charter school student achievement have found negative effects. Additionally, to 
date, I use the most comprehensive list of behavioral outcomes.  
Data  
Data and Sample 
The North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI) collects administrative 
data on all public and charter school students in the state. These data are maintained by the North 
Carolina Education Research Data Center and include information on students, teachers, 
classrooms, schools, and districts in North Carolina. Students are longitudinally linked and 
therefore can be followed over time.  
My sample includes all TPS and charter school students in grades 3 through 8 from 2006 
to 2009. Approximately 2.6 million observations of 1.1 million students were included in my 
analytic sample. While data has been collected on student attendance and suspension rates up to 
2011, there was a high amount of missing data during the latter years, and thus, these data were 
excluded from my analysis.5 Additionally, listwise deletion was employed on observations 
missing data on dependent or independent variables (Carruthers, 2012).  
 
 
                                                 
5Models were run with a larger sample using data up to 2011. Overall, my conclusions remained the same.  
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Measures 
Dependent Variables 
Absences. Measures of behavioral outcomes included absences, tardies, and suspensions. 
Absences are measured using two separate indicators: 1) number of days absent and 2) number 
of days of unexcused absences. Parents or guardians are required to notify schools if their child 
is going to be absent and to provide a reason for the absence. Students receive excused absences 
for any of the following reasons: 1) illness or injury; 2) quarantine, 3) death in the immediate 
family, 4) medical or dental appointments, 5) court or administrative proceedings, 6) religious 
observance, 7) educational opportunity, 8) local school board policy, 9) absence related to 
deployment activities, and 10) child care. Any other reason for being absent is considered 
unexcused (NCDPI, 2014).  
Tardies. Tardiness is measured by the number of days a student is late to school. Students 
may be suspended for up to 2 days for “excessive tardiness” (NCDPI, 2014).  
Suspensions. Students may incur out-of-school and in-school suspensions. Each type of 
suspension is measured in two ways: 1) number of times a student was suspended and 2) number 
of days a student was suspended. Students may be suspended for violating the local education 
board’s Code of Student Conduct. In-school suspensions include assignments to alternative 
school programs for a short period of time (NCDPI, 2015).  
Independent Variables 
Charter School. Students were identified as attending a charter school or a TPS. This is 
the main independent variable of interest. 
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Years in Charter School. The number of consecutive years a student attended a charter 
school was grouped into four categories: first year in a charter school, second year in a charter 
school, third year in a charter school, and fourth year or more in a charter school.  
Additional Controls. Time-invariant covariates included race and gender. Race was 
comprised of five categories including black, Asian, Hispanic, Native American, multiracial, and 
white. White was the referent category.  
Time-variant covariates included dummy variables indicating limited English proficient 
status (LEP), disability status, free or reduced price lunch eligibility, academic giftedness, and 
Title 1 school. Indicators of structural change and non-structural change, with no change being 
the reference category, were also included. A structural move is defined as a situation in which a 
student and at least 30 percent of those in his or her same grade and school moved together to 
another school (Carruthers, 2012; Sass, 2006). In other words, a structural move is made if a 
student moves from elementary school to middle school. A non-structural move indicates if a 
student changed schools during elementary or middle school. Students were considered 
academically gifted if they identified as gifted in either math or reading or both. Students were 
labeled as disabled if they had a learning disability in one or more of four areas: reading, writing, 
math, or other. Lastly, models included grade and grade squared.  
Methods 
To estimate the effect of charter schools on behavioral outcomes, I estimate pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS), student random effects, and student fixed effects models. The 
student random effects and fixed effects models build on the pooled OLS model. Each of these 
models has certain strengths and weaknesses, which are discussed in more detail below. 
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Pooled OLS 
I begin my analysis by estimating a pooled OLS model of the education production 
function. This model includes:  
 
(1) Yti = β0 + β1Charterti + β2Gradeti + β3Grade2ti + β4XTti + β5Xi + ti 
 
where Y is the one of the behavioral dependent measures at time t for student i and is regressed 
on a charter indicator, grade, and grade squared. Vectors of time-variant covariates (XT) and 
time-invariant covariates (X) were also included.  
There are two major assumptions that, if violated, would lead to biased estimates of the 
pooled OLS model. First, this model assumes that the error term, ti, is independent across 
observations. Since my data is longitudinal, this assumption does not hold. Second, estimates 
from pooled OLS models are unbiased only if all possible confounding factors are included in 
the model. Previous literature was used to determine which confounding covariates were to be 
included in the present model. However, in any model, this assumption is typically violated since 
it is difficult to identify and measure all confounding covariates.   
Student Random Effects Model 
 To account for the longitudinal nature of the data analyzed, I use a student random effects 
model. This model is more efficient and less biased than the pooled OLS model. Random effects 
models use precision-weighted least-squares estimates calculated from between effects and fixed 
effects models. In other words, random effects models provide the weighted average of the 
between and fixed effect estimates. Specifically, I estimate the following model:  
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(2) Yti = β0 + β1Charterti + β2Gradeti + β3Grade2ti + β4XTti + β5Xi + ti + u0i.  
 
The key difference between the pooled OLS and random effects model is the random effects 
model allows for within-unit correlations. In other words, an individual student’s error term (u0i) 
is clustered across time while ti still accounts for the student’s time-varying residual. Similar to 
the pooled OLS model, both time-invariant and time-variant covariates are included to ensure the 
least biased estimates.6  
Student Fixed Effects Model 
The final model analyzed was the student fixed effects model. This model includes: 
 
(3) Yti = β0 + β1Charterti + β2Gradeti + β3Grade2ti + β4XTti + i  + ti 
 
where each student is allowed his or her own deviation, i , from the mean intercept (β0). The 
main advantage of using a student fixed effects model is that students are only being compared to 
themselves, and thus, time-invariant observable and unobservable covariates are not included as 
possible confounders. However, student fixed effects model estimates are based solely on 
switchers, i.e. students who switch from charter schools to TPSs or vice versa. Consequently, 
these estimates may not apply to students who are only observed in charter schools. To 
determine the validity of this model, researchers must determine if switchers are representative 
of the entire charter school population. Unlike equations (1) and (2), equation (3) only includes 
time-varying covariates (XTti) as possible confounders. 
                                                 
6Linear and non-linear growth models, variations of student random effects models were also analyzed. These are a 
type of random effects model, and provided similar results to the student random effects model used. 
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Other Models  
Other models considered included a hurdle regression model. This model is similar to a 
2-part model and is used when there is zero-inflation of the dependent variable. The first part of 
the model includes a logit or probit binary model with a dummy variable indicating whether the 
actual count is greater than zero. The second part of the model includes a zero-truncated count 
model, such as a Poisson or negative binomial model that is run on non-zero counts only. The 
hurdle model was not used for two reasons. First, these models have limited interpretation when 
fixed effects are included. Second, because nonrandom assignment is an overwhelming concern 
when estimating charter school effects, these models would provide biased estimates without 
taking into account the longitudinal nature of the data. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
To determine the robustness of the models used in this study, two alternative 
specifications were also examined. First, VAMs were estimated. VAMs assume that prior inputs 
can be summarized by a student’s lagged outcome variable (Todd & Wolpin, 2003; Todd & 
Wolpin, 2007). However, this model also induces endogeneity since prior inputs most likely 
influence current inputs. Second, there may be effects that are grade and year specific. To test 
this issue, I also examined models in which grade and grade squared were replaced with grade-
year indicators. Results from both of these model specifications were similar to those presented 
below. 
Results 
My analysis begins by examining the descriptive characteristics of TPSs and charter 
schools in North Carolina (Table 3.1). This provides initial evidence that charter schools have 
different environments compared to TPSs. In North Carolina, charter schools have less crime per 
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100 students (.17 vs. .61), lower school enrollment rates (252 vs. 547), and are less likely to be 
Title I schools (19% vs. 58%). Charter schools have slightly higher proportions of black students 
than TPSs (37% vs. 31%) but similar percentages of white students (53% vs. 54%). Overall, 
charter schools may produce better learning environments compared to TPSs.  
Examining the differences in the characteristics of charter school only students, TPS only 
students and switchers illustrated that, overall, switchers appear to be negatively selected 
compared to charter school only students (Table 3.2). Switchers are more likely to be absent, 
tardy, and suspended than charter school only students. Additionally, switchers are more likely to 
be eligible for free or reduced price lunch (36% vs. 18%), to attend a Title I school7 (25% vs. 
8%) and to be black (37% vs. 23%) than charter school only students. The majority of charter 
school only students are white (68%). Similar shares of disabled (5%) and LEP students (2%) 
were switchers and charter school only students. Due to switchers being negatively selected, the 
results from the student fixed effects model will most likely underestimate the effect of charter 
schools on students’ behavioral outcomes.  
Among absences, unexcused absences, and tardies, the effect of charter schools varied 
(Table 3.3). For the outcome, days absent, charter schools are associated with a statistically 
significant decrease in the number of days absent in all model specifications. Using the student 
fixed effects model, a charter school student misses .28 days less than a TPS student. Therefore, 
attending a charter school is associated with a modest decrease in the average number of days a 
student is absent.  The effect of charter schools on the number of unexcused absences varies 
depending on the model specification; the pooled OLS and student random effects models show 
that charter school students have fewer unexcused absences compared to TPS students. However, 
                                                 
7Similar to TPSs, public charter schools can receive Title I funds and are still held accountable for making adequate 
yearly progress.  
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using the student fixed effects model, charter school students have .17 more days of unexcused 
absences compared to TPS students. In other words, switchers, or students with worse 
background characteristics, have fewer unexcused absences. Finally, charter schools have no 
statistically significant effect on the number of days a student is tardy.  
In all model specifications, charter school students had fewer and shorter in-school and 
out-of-school suspensions compared to TPS students (Table 3.4). Both the student random and 
fixed effects models on the days of in-school suspensions show that charter school students have 
shorter in-school suspensions, equating to about half a day, compared to TPS students. Using 
student random effects, charter school students' out-of-school suspensions are a little more than 
half a day (.62) shorter compared to TPS's out-of-school suspensions. The student fixed effects 
model shows that charter school students out-of-school suspensions are about one day (.92) 
shorter compared to those in TPSs.  
To explain the variation in the coefficients among the student fixed effects models using 
absences, unexcused absences, and tardies as outcomes, the effect of a student’s time in a charter 
school was examined (Figure 3.1). For all dependent variables, the beneficial effect of charter 
schools on student's behavioral outcomes increased the longer a student attended a charter 
school; in other words, as students continued to attend charter schools, they had fewer absences 
and in-school and out-of-school suspensions. Charter schools had no statistically significant 
effect on students' tardiness during their first year of attending a charter school. By their second 
year, however, charter school students received fewer tardies compared to TPS students. In fact, 
the longer a student remained in a charter school, the fewer tardies a student received each year. 
The effect of attending a charter school on unexcused absences followed a similar trend but did 
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not become significantly different from TPSs until students had attended a charter school for at 
least 4 years.  
Discussion  
Charter schools in North Carolina appear to provide better learning environments for 
students compared to TPSs. Consequently, even when negatively selected students switch into 
charter schools, their behavioral outcomes improve as measured by behavioral outcomes such as 
absences, tardies, and suspensions. Suspensions and regular absences decrease immediately. In 
terms of tardiness and unexcused absences, students must be enrolled in a charter school for at 
least 2 years before students’ tardiness decreases and about 4 years before students’ unexcused 
absences decrease. The effects of charter schools on students’ behavioral outcomes may develop 
in an even shorter time frame, considering these estimates are based on negatively selected 
switchers.  
The student fixed effects model most likely underestimates the effect of charter schools 
on students’ behavioral outcomes, considering that switchers appear to be negatively selected 
compared to charter school only students. One might suggest that charter schools should have the 
biggest impact on negatively selected students. Most likely, the true marginal effect of charter 
schools on behavioral outcomes falls between the coefficients computed by the student random 
effects and student fixed effects models. Consequently, it could be argued that charter schools 
indeed decrease students’ absences and all types of suspensions.  
Some studies have found that the impact of charter schools on student absences does not 
necessarily develop due to the positive environment of charter schools, but instead, due to 
students’ ability to choose the school they wish to attend. One study found that absences 
decreased up to 21% for males entering high school after winning a charter school lottery but 
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prior to actually enrolling in their new charter school (Hastings, Neilson, & Zimmerman, 2012). 
The results of this present study show that this is not the case in North Carolina since absences 
continue to decrease the longer a student remains in a charter school. If choice was the only 
variable affecting students’ absences, they would remain constant over time after experiencing 
one significant drop. Instead, the marginal effect of attending a charter school on student 
absences increases over time. 
These findings have policy implications for charter schools and provide some clarity as to 
why charter schools are becoming increasingly popular with parents and students. Despite the 
mixed results charter schools have on student achievement, charter schools appear to have 
positive effects on several other student outcomes including their behavioral outcomes. 
Considering the importance of these outcomes in terms of students’ future success (Heckman, 
Pinto, & Savelyev, 2013; Goldin & Katz, 2007; Card, 1999), the growing support for and 
investment in charter schools is warranted.  
 While the results of this study were robust to several model specifications, some 
limitations should be noted. As with all charter school studies that use observational data, 
selection bias is always a concern. However, by showing that behavioral outcomes continue to 
improve even among worse-off students provides strong evidence that charter schools are having 
positive effects on students in general. The by-year results should still be cautiously interpreted 
since it could be the case that students whose behavioral outcomes are improving are the ones 
that are deciding to stay in charter schools while those that show no improvement select out of 
charter schools after one or two years. Second, results using number or days of in-school and 
out-of-school suspensions should be interpreted cautiously. State policies in North Carolina 
regarding suspensions are relatively open. Local school boards make their own policies as to 
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what behaviors and actions lead to suspensions, and thus these results may reflect enforcement 
differences. Interestingly, most studies have actually shown that charter schools have stricter 
rules and student conduct codes than TPSs (Gleason et al., 2010), which suggests that students 
should be suspended more often if there was no change in their behavioral outcomes. However, 
these results show that the opposite is true; despite charter schools having stricter student 
policies, suspensions and tardies decrease.  
There are several ways in which research on student behavioral outcomes can be 
extended. First, this study uses data collected over a 4-year time span up to the year 2009. Future 
research should use data collected over a longer time period since fixed effects and random 
effects models work best with several years of data. Second, future research should examine 
other indicators of behavioral outcomes to test the robustness of my results. For example, other 
studies have used Likert scales to measure students’ competence and classroom adjustment. 
Additional studies have used the number of times a student gets into a fight or is sent to the 
office for poor behavior as indicators of behavioral development. As aforementioned, a study on 
the Promise Academy in the Harlem Children’s Zone recently showed that female students were 
less likely to become pregnant and male students were less likely to be incarcerated (Dobbie & 
Fryer, 2013).  
Finally, as former charter school students start to graduate from college, more studies 
should determine if charter school students’ success as an adult is markedly different from their 
TPS peers. Studies examining college graduation rates, wages, and employment of charter school 
graduates would help illustrate whether charter schools are having lasting, positive effects.  
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%/mean SD %/mean SD
Average Enrollment 547 265 252 32
% Female 0.47 0.05 0.49 0.05
Title 1 School 0.58 0.49 0.19 0.39
Crimes per 100 Students 0.61 1.95 0.17 0.53
Ethnic Composition 
% Black 0.31 0.25 0.37 0.36
% Hispanic 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.06
% White 0.53 0.28 0.54 0.37
Location 
Urban 0.24 0.43 0.40 0.49
Suburban 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.31
Town 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36
Rural 0.47 0.50 0.34 0.47
Observations (school-years) 7309 325
Table 3.1 Descriptive Characteristics of Schools in North Carolina (Grades 3-12, 
2006-2009)
Traditional Public 
Schools Charter Schools
Note: Averages may be slightly skewed for certain variables since data was missing on a 
few schools. Less than 1% of data was missing on any one variable reported.  
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%/mean SD %/mean SD %/mean SD
Dependent Variables
Days Absent 7.07 (7.39) 6.18 (6.07) 7.17 (7.29)
Days Unexcused Absent 3.17 (4.80) 2.60 (4.28) 3.23 (4.90)
Number of Tardies 2.02 (5.77) 1.63 (6.23) 2.54 (7.19)
Number of In-School Suspensions 0.25 (1.06) 0.01 (0.12) 0.16 (0.88)
Days In-School Suspension 0.44 (2.17) 0.01 (0.22) 0.28 (1.73)
Number of Out-of-School Suspensions 0.28 (1.04) 0.07 (0.36) 0.27 (1.01)
Days Out-of-School Suspension 0.87 (4.60) 0.17 (2.17) 0.86 (5.03)
Independent Variables
Free/Reduced Price Lunch 0.47 (0.50) 0.18 (0.38) 0.36 (0.48)
Limited English Proficient 0.06 (0.24) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.13)
Title I School 0.35 (0.48) 0.08 (0.28) 0.25 (0.44)
Disability Status 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22)
Academically Gifted 0.14 (0.34) 0.02 (0.14) 0.07 (0.26)
Female 0.49 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50)
Race 
Asian 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.11)
Black 0.27 (0.44) 0.23 (0.42) 0.37 (0.48)
Hispanic 0.10 (0.29) 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.18)
American Indian 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.10) 0.02 (0.14)
Multiracial 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.16) 0.04 (0.19)
White 0.56 (0.50) 0.68 (0.47) 0.53 (0.50)
Observations (student-years) 2467416 32485 67077
Note: Means for dependent variables are based on varying sample sizes. Observations in student-years are based 
on independent variables. 
Table 3.2 North Carolina Students (Grades 3-12, 2006-2009)
TPS Students 
Only 
Charter School 
Students Only  Switchers
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Outcomes
Models Coef. Coef. Coef.
Pooled OLS
Charter School -0.46 (0.04) *** -0.14 (0.03) *** 0.03 (0.04)
Random Effects 
Charter School -0.46 (0.04) *** -0.11 (0.03) *** 0.03 (0.05)
Fixed Effects 
Charter School -0.28 (0.07) *** 0.17 (0.07) * 0.09 (0.13)
Table 3.3 Effect of Attending a Charter School on Absences, Unexcused Absences and 
Tardies (Grade 3-12, 2006-2009)
Absences 
Unexcused 
Absences
SE SE
Observations (student-years)
Note: All models include grade and grade-squared. Additional control variables include LEP status, 
race, gender, free/reduced price lunch eligibility, disability status, academic giftedness, Title 1 school, 
and structural/non-strucutural change indicators. Robust SEs are in parentheses. 
Tardies 
SE
1955402 1523546 1393502
*Statistically significant at the 5% level       **Statistically significant at the 1% level       
***Statistically significant at the .1% level 
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CHAPTER 4: ARE CHARTER SCHOOLS RETAINING EFFECTIVE TEACHERS?: 
EVIDENCE FROM NORTH CAROLINA 
Introduction 
While there is mounting evidence that teachers are essential to increasing student 
achievement and improving the U.S. education system (Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, & Rivkin, 
2005; Jackson, 2012; Rockoff, 2004; Aaronson, Barrow, & Sander, 2007), young adults continue 
to feel ambivalent about joining the profession. High quality, effective teachers increase 
academic achievement of students from any ability level and have the largest positive impact on 
low-performing students (Aaronson et al., 2007; Hanushek et al., 2005). However, teachers 
continue to earn significantly less than their peers in comparable professions (Allegretto, 
Corcoran, & Mishel, 2004), and the average teacher salary has decreased over 15 percent, 
adjusting for inflation, since 2004. In particular, for the past 5 years, teacher turnover in North 
Carolina has continued to increase (NCDPI, 2015), and North Carolina has the lowest per student 
expenditure rates in the US (NEA, 2015).  
Since charter school legislation was first passed in 1991, charter schools have become a 
popular alternative to TPSs and are touted as the best solution to fixing the US education system. 
One of the key theoretical explanations for why charter schools should be effective at increasing 
student achievement is their potential as incubators of innovation. Most notably, charter schools 
can develop their own organizational and staffing policies (Stuit & Smith, 2012; Cowen & 
Winters, 2013). These alternative policies are the key to attracting and retaining effective 
teachers since they simultaneously give teachers more flexibility to perfect their teaching style 
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while also giving school administrators the ability to remove ineffective teachers and award 
effective teachers.  
This study examines whether charter schools are more likely to retain effective and high 
quality teachers than TPSs. Using data from North Carolina, I first quantify a teacher’s 
effectiveness using a valued added model (VAM). Then, using a multinomial logit, I evaluate if 
high quality charter school teachers are more likely to remain in their particular school than high 
quality TPS teachers. Previous research in Florida has shown that there is no difference in 
teacher effectiveness and teacher exit between charter schools and TPSs. Besides using data from 
North Carolina, I build on this Florida study by using a more stringent VAM to evaluate teacher 
effectiveness.  This study adds to the growing literature on understanding the characteristics of 
charter schools that negatively or positively affect student achievement (Betts & Loveless, 2005; 
Gill, Timpane, Ross, & Brewer, 2001; Zimmer et al., 2003).  
Background: Charter Schools in North Carolina  
In 1996, North Carolina legislators passed the Charter Schools Act allowing for the 
development of 100 charter schools. Thirty-four charter schools opened the following school 
year. In 2011, the 100 charter school cap was lifted, so that currently there are 158 charter 
schools in North Carolina. About four percent of North Carolina’s school-age population attends 
charter schools while, within each county, the percent of the student population enrolled in a 
charter school ranges from zero to 16 percent (See Figure 3.1).  
Charters schools are one form of school choice that decentralizes public education. Local, 
state, and federal funds support charter schools, with state funds being their primary source of 
support. Unlike TPSs, charter school enrollment is not restricted by a student’s residence, and 
charter schools develop their own policies and regulations. A charter school’s board of directors 
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is in charge of the budget, curriculum, and other opertaional activities. For example, the school 
board is not required to provide transportation or meals to students, even students eligible for 
free or reduced price lunch.  
Charter schools in North Carolina also follow different guidelines when hiring and recruiting 
teachers. The North Carolina Charter School Application Resource Manual (2015) states that 
charter schools have the ability to:  
“…purchase off state contract [unless using certain federal funds 
with requirements placed upon these funds by the federal 
government, i.e. Race to the Top Funding]; hire non-certified 
teachers [with percentage limits and in accordance with NCLB 
criteria]; hire teaching personnel on at-will contracts; and negotiate 
personnel salaries.”8  
As suggested above, charter schools develop their own policies from teachers’ vacation time to 
health insurance to retirement benefits (See Figure 3.2 for a complete list). Additionally, teachers 
at charter schools do not have to be licensed; fifty percent of middle and high school teachers 
and 25 percent of elementary school teachers can be unlicensed (Office of Charter Schools, 
2015). 
Charter school teachers are given more leeway in determining how they perform daily 
operations compared to TPS teachers. One specific purpose of charter schools in North Carolina 
is to “create new professional opportunities for teachers” (§ 155C-238.29a(4)9; see Carruthers, 
2012). While charter school and TPS teachers are still held accountable for ensuring that their 
                                                 
8See http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/charterschools/applications/resourcemanual.pdf. 
 
9North Carolina General Statutes. § 155C-238.29a(4). See 
www.ncga.state.nc.us/enactedlegislation/statutes/html/bysection/chapter_115C/gs_115c-238.29a.html. 
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students’ academic achievement increases, charter school teachers can structure their lesson 
plans, curriculum, and other educational opportunities in whichever way they believe will be 
most beneficial to their students. Charter school teachers are encouraged to think innovatively 
and try new teaching techniques.  
Theoretical Considerations  
Several theories explain why effective charter school and TPS teachers may be attracted 
to teach in their respective school types. Market theory purports that charter schools, as a form of 
school choice, “stimulate the development and improvement of schools through market 
competition” (Friedman, 1962; Chubb & Moe, 1990). Charter schools are theoretically of higher 
quality than TPSs because they are incentivized to be innovative. In competing for students, 
charter school must offer a better product, or education. School choice and competition leads to a 
faster rate of innovation since schools have to stay focused on providing a superior education 
(Becker, 1999; Friedman, 1955; Chubb & Moe, 1990; Coulson, 1999; Friedman & Friedman, 
1980; Gintis, 1995; Lubienski, 2005). Teachers, consequently, will be incentivized to find the 
most effective teaching techniques and thus be more effective overall. Unregulated charter 
schools provide teachers with the autonomy to innovate and improve student outcomes (Miron & 
Applegate, 2007; Mintrom, 2000). 
Market theory predicts charter schools attract better teachers relative to TPSs. Similar to 
how charter schools induce schools to compete for students, they also compel them to compete 
for teachers. Charter schools offer teachers a variety of different benefits, salary levels, and 
working environments. Additionally, an extension of this research finds that teachers are less 
likely to leave if they have more autonomy and decision-making power (Ingersoll, 2001; Smith 
& Rowley, 2005). In contrast, teachers in highly regulated and systematized TPSs have little 
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incentive to improve or even maintain a certain standard of quality (Chubb & Moe, 1990). The 
presence of charter schools allows teachers a greater variety of employment options. Overall, 
charter schools can offer teachers competitive wages and benefits while also providing them with 
the freedom to innovate and develop their professional competencies. 
However, despite the increased autonomy and benefits, the particular organizational 
characteristics of charter schools can discourage teachers. Several studies have found that charter 
school teachers are quickly “burning out” due to their high workload and long work days 
(Hubbard & Kulkarni, 2009; Malloy & Wohlstetter, 2003; Vasadeva & Grutzik, 2002; Weiss, 
1997).  Teacher burnout not only plagues new charter schools but also those that have operated 
for several years (Finn, Manno, & Vanourek, 2000). These conditions may induce even effective 
and motivated teachers to leave.  
According to new institutional theory, a subset of organizational theory, charter schools 
will not be markedly different from TPSs. New institutional theory assumes that organizations, 
such as schools, are highly regulated and static (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) due to the 
overwhelming influence of an organization’s history (North, 1990). Communities with strong 
values implicitly define what is considered to be a legitimate school. In order to be successful, 
new schools are strongly incentivized to adopt similar norms and structures that validate and 
legitimize existing customs. Ultimately, this leads to organizational isomorphism (Meyer & 
Ramirez, 2000; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and suggests that charter schools would ultimately revert 
back to more traditional learning systems without innovative practices (Lubienski, 2005). 
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Literature Review  
Teacher Effectiveness and Exit   
Previous research showed that more “highly qualified” teachers, determined using 
teacher credentials, test scores, and education, were more likely to leave the teaching profession 
(Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2005; Goldhaber & Hansen, 2009; Podursky, Monroe, & 
Watson, 2004; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 1999). Teachers with the highest scores on their 
general certification exams or who were National Board for Professional Teaching Standard 
certified were more likely to exit schools with low performing students (Boyd et al., 2005; 
Goldhaber & Hansen, 2009). Academically gifted teachers, such as teachers that attended highly 
selective colleges or received high ACT scores, were also more likely to leave schools with low 
SES student bodies and exit the teaching profession (Podursky et al., 2004; Lankford et al., 
2002). However, these easily measurable teacher qualifications only had a weak relationship 
with student achievement making the results from these studies weaker than those that used 
VAMs to estimate teacher effectiveness (Aaronson et al., 2007; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 
2007; Goldhaber & Brewer, 2001; Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, 2006; Hanushek, 1986, 1997).  
 Recent studies using VAMs to quantify teacher effectiveness have found the opposite 
results. Data analyzed from North Carolina, Texas, and Florida consistently showed that 
ineffective teachers in TPSs were the most likely to leave the teaching profession (Boyd et al., 
2008; Feng & Sass, 2008; Goldhaber, Gross, & Player, 2011; Krieg, 2006; Hanushek, Kain, & 
Rivkin, 2004; West & Chingos, 2009). These results were true across all school subjects. A study 
of high school math and science teachers showed that teachers who remained in the teaching 
67 
 
profession after at least 5 years of teaching were more effective than teachers who left earlier 
(Henry, Fortner, & Bastian, 2012). Additional research showed similar results for math and 
English teachers in grades 3 through 12 (Henry, Bastian, & Fortner, 2011). Because these 
estimates were based on student test scores, they were a better reflection of teacher effectiveness.  
Charter School Teachers  
Several studies showed that charter school teachers demographically differed from TPS 
teachers. Specifically, charter school teachers were less experienced, younger, and less licensed 
(Carruthers, 2012; Epple, Romano, & Zimmer, 2015; Miron & Applegate, 2007; Stuit & Smith, 
2012). On average, charter school teachers had 3.6 years of teaching experience while TPS 
teachers have about 8.1 years of teaching experience (Epple et al., 2015), and about a third of 
charter school teachers were under the age of 30 (Stuit & Smith, 2012). However, charter schools 
were also more likely to hire teachers from highly competitive undergraduate institutions (Baker 
& Dickerson, 2006) although charter school teachers were less likely than TPS teachers to have 
graduate level degrees (Epple et al., 2015). Additionally, while all TPSs required their teachers to 
be licensed, the majority of charter schools did not have licensing requirements. 
Charter schools typically had significantly higher teacher turnover rates than TPSs (Cowen & 
Winters, 2013; Miron & Applegate, 2007; Podgursky & Ballou, 2001; Smith & Ingersoll, 2004; 
Stuit & Smith, 2012). Research in Florida and North Carolina indicated that charter school 
teachers were twice as likely to leave compared to TPS teachers (Carruthers, 2012; Cowen & 
Winters, 2013). Similarly, a multistate study showed charter school teacher turnover typically 
ranged from 15 to 40 percent while TPS teacher turnover ranged from only 11 to 14 percent 
(Miron & Applegate, 2007). Most studies attributed the high teacher turnover rate to the 
younger, less experienced, and less certified teacher population in charter schools (Miron & 
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Applegate 2007; Stuit & Smith, 2012). In terms of teacher effectiveness, the least effective 
charter school teachers were more likely to exit, mirroring findings found on TPS teacher exit 
(Cowen & Winters, 2013).  
Few studies evaluted charter schools teachers in North Carolina. Using a sample of TPSs 
teachers, Jackson (2012) examined how the building and establishment of charter schools 
influenced teacher retention. He found that TPSs with low-income, high-minority populations 
experienced a small decrease in teacher quality when charter schools were built in the same 
vicinity as TPSs. However, Carruthers (2012) found that charter schools were more likely to 
draw away and hire less effective TPS teachers. In other words, less effective TPS school 
teachers were leaving TPSs to teach instead at a charter school. The present study builds upon 
this research by comparing the movement of charter school and TPS teachers.   
Data 
Data in this study comes from the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI) 
administrative records. These data are maintained by the North Carolina Education Research 
Data Center (NCDERC) and includes state-wide information on North Carolina’s students, 
teachers, classrooms, schools, and districts. Students are longitudinally linked and therefore can 
be followed from year to year. Additionally, students are linked to teachers who proctored their 
End-of-Grade math and reading exams.  
The analytic sample includes TPS and charter school teachers for grades 4 and 5 from the 
2008-2009 and 2009-2010 school years. I restricted my sample to teachers in self-contained 
classrooms to ensure that the student-teacher link provided a good match between students and 
their actual classroom teacher. Additionally, the NCERDC only recently started collecting data 
on self-contained classrooms of charter school teachers which limited this analysis to two years 
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of data. Finally, teachers linked to less than 10 students in a given year were dropped from 
analysis to ensure an accurate estimate of teacher quality was calculated.   
Methods 
Estimating Teacher Effectiveness  
Teachers’ level of effectiveness per year was estimated using a VAM and adjusted by an 
empirically Bayesian shrinkage factor (Kane & Staiger, 2002; Jacob & Lefgren, 2008). 
Specifically, the VAM employed was a 3-level hierarchical linear model, a type of nested 
random effects model. Random effects models control for a rich amount of student, classroom, 
and school characteristics. I estimate teacher’s effectiveness separately for each year since 
previous studies show that teacher effectiveness can vary substantially from year to year (Sass, 
2006; Koedel & Betts, 2011).  A previous study comparing 9 types of VAMs shows that 3-level 
hierarchical linear models including a least one pretest score provided the most reliable estimates 
of teacher effectiveness (Rose, Henry, & Lauen, 2012).  
In my model, students were nested within classrooms within schools. VAMs numerically 
evaluate the contribution a teacher makes to a student’s achievement: 
(1) Yijst = β0 + β1Yit-1 + β2Xijst + β3Cjst + β4Sst + ϕjst + ijst. 
Subscripts i, j, s, and t index the student, teacher, school, and year, respectively. The dependent 
variable, Yijst, represents students’ End-of-Grade standardized math or reading test scores. To 
control for past inputs and innate ability, students’ one year prior standardized test score, Yit-1 , 
was included (Carruthers, 2012; Koedel & Betts, 2011). Kane and Staiger (2008) found that 
specifications including lagged achievement yielded teacher effect estimates comparable to the 
estimates found under experimental settings where teachers are randomly matched to students. 
Vectors X, C, and S represent student-, classroom-, and school-level covariates, respectively. 
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Student-level covariates included indicators of sex, race, academic giftedness, learning disability, 
eligibility for free/reduced price lunch (FRPL), limited English proficient (LEP) status, and 
movement to another school. A covariate estimating peer ability, measured by averaging the test 
scores of a student’s previous classmates was included, which addressed violating the stable unit 
treatment value assumption, or SUTVA (Rose et al., 2012). SUTVA states that the treatment 
effect will not change depending on the composition of a teacher’s classroom (Rubin, Stuart, & 
Zanutto, 2004). Classroom covariates consisted of class size, percent FRPL, and percent LEP. 
School-level measures included average school enrollment, enrollment squared, percent FRLP, 
Title I eligibility, crimes per 100 students, percent black, percent Hispanic, and percent white, 
and school location (i.e. urban, suburban, town, or rural). Lastly, ϕjst was the estimated teacher 
effect. Year fixed effects were also included in this model.  
Estimating Teacher Movement 
To estimate whether effective charter school teachers are more or less likely to exit their 
respective schools, I employed a multinomial logit (MNL) model. MNL models describe the 
conditional probability that a teacher makes one of the two types of moves described, relative to 
the probability of remaining in her or his given school, as:  
(2) P(Yi=m)=
exp(Z𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡)
1+∑ exp⁡(𝑍𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡)
𝑀
𝑚
 
where  
Zmjst= γϕj + π1Xj + π3S s,t-1  + τt + ejst. 
The dependent variable, Zmjst, represents a teachers’ move and indicates if a teacher was retained 
by his or her school (=1), exited the school system (=2), or transferred to another school (=3). 
Vectors X and S represent teacher- and school-level covariates, respectively. The two key 
independent variables include teacher’s effectiveness (ϕj) and a charter school indicator (one of 
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the school-level covariates included in vector S). Teacher covariates include sex, race, and class 
size. School covariates include average enrollment, enrollment squared, percent FRPL, Title I 
eligibility, crimes per 100 students, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent white, and school 
location (i.e. urban, suburban, town, and rural). Year-fixed effects were also included (τ).  
 Because the outcome is a categorical indicator, results include coefficients for each 
covariate in reference to the base category. For example, since the base category is teacher 
retained, and I expect more effective teachers to be retained, the teacher effectiveness coefficient 
should be negative and statistically significant. If less effective teachers are retained, the teacher 
effectiveness coefficient should be positive and statistically significant. Additionally, if charter 
schools are more likely to retain teachers (and the base category is still teacher is retained), the 
charter school indicator coefficient will be negative and statistically significant.   
 I also run another multinomial logit which includes an interaction term between the 
covariates measuring teacher effectiveness and indicating a charter school. This interaction term 
illustrates whether the relationship between teacher effectiveness and teacher exit dramatically 
differs between charter and TPSs. In other words, if the interaction term is statistically significant 
for either type of teacher exit indicated by my two outcome categories, this will confirm that 
there is a substantial difference in the types of teachers (in terms of their effectiveness) exiting 
TPSs and charter schools.  
 A linear probability model (LPM) was included as a sensitivity check. LPMs use dummy 
variables as their dependent variable and help predict the likelihood of each type of exit. For the 
LPM used in this study, the outcome variable indicated if a teacher was retained the following 
year. The MNL was used as the main model since there are a few problems with LPM models. 
First, a LPM model, by definition, has heteroskedastic and thus unreliable standard errors. 
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Second, predictions from a LPM model may fall out of the 0 to 1 range. Thus, some of the 
predictions may not be accurate. While the LPM model is useful to check the robustness of my 
results, the estimates from the MNL model will be more consistent overall.   
 While both student’s math and reading test scores were used to calculate teacher 
effectiveness, I only present the results using the math test scores since the reading test scores 
results were similar unless otherwise noted.  
Results  
My analysis begins by observing the differences in school characteristics and teacher 
mobility rates between charter schools and TPSs. In general, charter schools seem to have more 
positively selected characteristics than TPSs (Table 4.1). Charter schools enroll fewer students 
(427 versus 519), have less crime per 100 students (.14 versus .16), a higher proportion of white 
students (56% versus 52%) and a lower proportion of Latino students (4% versus 13%) 
compared to TPSs. However, TPSs have a smaller proportion of black students. Most charter 
schools are located in urban areas (42%) while most TPSs are found in rural locations (48%). 
Finally, TPS teachers are, on average, more effective than charter school teachers (.00 versus      
-.02, not reported in table). The majority of both charter school (63%) and TPS teachers (68%) 
remain in their respective schools (Table 4.2). Slightly more charter school teachers exit the 
North Carolina school system than TPS teachers (35.2% versus 28.3%). Finally, a small 
proportion of charter and TPS teachers transfer to other schools (1.9% and 3.7%, respectively). 
While the average teacher and classroom characteristics are similar among teachers who 
remain in their school, exit their school, and switch schools, the overall school characteristics 
among these groups differ (Table 4.3). The majority of 4th and 5th grade teachers in North 
Carolina's public school system are white (85%) and female (89%). The average class size is 22 
73 
 
children, the majority of students are white (55%), and almost a third are black (29%). Teachers  
remain in schools that have less crime, fewer students eligible for free and/or reduced price 
lunch, fewer black students, and more white students. Additionally, these teachers are, on 
averager, more effective. Teachers are more likely to exit schools that are Title 1 eligible and that 
enroll fewer students. Teachers exiting the school system are also the least effective. Also, 
teachers are more likely to transfer from schools that have higher proportions of black and 
Hispanic students. 
The MNLs show that compared to teachers who transfer schools or exit the school 
system, effective teachers are more likely to be retained (Table 4.4). In other words, the least 
effective teachers are more likely to leave schools or transfer to another school. However, there 
is no statistically significant difference between charter school and TPS teachers in terms of their 
decision to exit or remain in their respective schools. Similarly, there is no difference between 
charter school and TPS teachers in their decision to transfer schools compared to remaining in 
their respective schools. Additionally, the MNL with the interaction effect confirms these results 
since the relationship between teacher effectiveness and teacher exit (or teacher transfer) does 
not appear to differ significantly by school sector. Similar results for the reading sample were 
found, although the effectiveness coefficient was only statistically significant for the teacher exit 
category (See Appendix Table C1). Finally, the robustness of my results were confirmed by a 
linear probability model (See Appendix Table C2). 
Discussion  
In North Carolina, charter schools appear to differ from TPSs in terms of their overall 
school characteristics. In contrast, teacher-level and classroom-level characteristics among 
charter schools and TPSs are almost the same. My analysis shows that high-performing teachers, 
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as measured by VAMs, are more likely to remain in their schools than low quality teachers. 
Additionally, despite the differences in school characteristics among charter and TPSs, there is 
no difference between charter school and TPS teachers in terms of movement among schools. In 
other words, charter schools are no better than TPSs at retaining effective teachers. 
The results of this study support the theory of organizational isomorphism, or the idea 
that charter schools are, in fact, organizationally similar to TPSs.  Charter schools do not appear 
to be retaining more effective teachers than TPSs. This remains true despite previous studies 
showing that, demographically, charter school teachers differ from TPS teachers (Carruthers, 
2012; Epple et al., 2015; Miron & Applegate, 2007; Stuit & Smith, 2012). In other words, the 
organizational characteristics of schools are making demographically different teachers conform 
to a certain standard. As seen in Table 4.1, although charter schools seem to have more valued 
school characteristics, the day-to-day classroom characteristics are similar between school 
sectors. 
This study has several policy implications. The NC legislature recently voted to phase out 
the teacher tenure system in TPSs and replace it with a tiered contract system. Other states, such 
as Florida and Louisiana, have already repealed their teacher tenure policies. Advocates of tenure 
systems argue that tenure ensures schools keep their best teachers. However, my results show 
that the most effective teachers remain in their schools, whether it is a charter, which do not 
typically have tenure systems, or TPS, which (until recently) had tenure systems. In other words, 
effective teachers are already more likely to stay in schools, even if tenure is not available.  
However, my analysis shows that teacher turnover in North Carolina is still relatively 
high in both charter schools and TPSs. Policies and programs need to be implemented to attract 
and retain more effective teachers into both North Carolina’s TPSs and charter schools. Teachers 
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are more likely to remain in schools with small class sizes, administrative suppport, and 
opportunities for professional advancement (Carter & Carter, 2000; Ingersoll, 2001; Whitener et 
al., 1997). Additionally, past studies examining the soft reasons that teachers remained in their 
schools include having autonomy, agreeing with a school’s mission, feeling supported by the 
principal, and working with likeminded educators (Stuit and Smith, 2012; Cannata & Penaloza, 
2012). These intangible facets of schools should continue to be evaluated.  
The results of this study are not without limitations. First, some teacher-level covariates 
such as years of experience, education, and licensure are not included in my analysis since they 
are absent from the data set for charter school teachers. Because teachers are not randomized into 
charter schools, teachers in charter schools substantially differ from TPS teachers; TPS teachers 
tend to be older, are licensed, and more educated (Carruthers, 2012; Epple, Romano, & Zimmer, 
2015; Miron & Applegate, 2007; Stuit & Smith, 2012). In models estimating teacher exit, 
estimates may be upwardly biased since one would assume that TPS teachers are more likely to 
be near retirement age and have more opportunities outside of teaching due to their higher levels 
of education. However, my results show that this is not necessarily the case; charter school 
teachers are just as likely to exit their school as TPS teachers. Of course, my results should be 
interpreted cautiously since omitted variable bias is still a serious conceptual and empirical issue 
for both analyzing school effects and evaluating policies.    
Second, only two years of data could be included in my analysis due to key variables 
missing for other school years. Future research should include several more years of data. This 
would not only confirm and strengthen these current findings but would also allow for using 
other types of VAMs (i.e. teacher fixed effects) to calculate teacher effectiveness.  Lastly, VAMs 
are only one way to measure teacher effectiveness, and researchers suggest that they only be 
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used for low stakes purposes (Rose et al., 2012). Consequently, future research should also 
employ other measures of teachers’ effectiveness such as teacher’s years of experience or 
education.  
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Source: http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/charterschools/membershipmap11-12.pdf 
Figure 4.1: Percentage of Students in Charter School Membership (2011-2012) 
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Figure 4.2: Benefits Set by NC for TPS Teachers (2012) 
 
 LEAVE BENEFITS Jury Duty
Vacation (based on state service) Court Attendance (not for personal reasons)
Vacation for Catastrophic Illness Military Leave & Possible Differential Pay
Vacation for Newborn, Adoptive or Foster Child Professional/Educational
Sick (one day per month) OTHER BENEFITS
Personal Retirement 
20 Day Extended Sick Death Benefit
Paid Holidays Disability
Voluntary Shared Leave Longevity
Sick Leave for Adoption (up to 30 days) Health Insurance
FMLA (if emp. 1 yr & if 1,250 hrs in last 12 mos) Professional Liability Insurance
Parental Involvement Tenure 
Episode of Violence Comp.Time/Overtime (If FLSA non-exempt)
Contagious Disease Social Security
Susp. with Pay (investigation/dismissal) Workers' Comp.
Community Responsibility Unemployment Insurance
Meetings for SBE, Gov., etc.
Notes: These benefits apply to full time permanent teachers. Charter school employee benefits are determined 
by the charter schools' Board of Directors. Information retrieved from 
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/humanresources/district-personnel/key-information/
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Table 4.1 North Carolina Elementary School Descriptives (2009-2010)
%/mean SD %/mean SD
Average Enrollment 519 201 427 302
% Female 49% 0.03 50% 0.05
Title 1 School 76% 0.43 58% 0.50
Crimes per 100 Students 0.16 0.43 0.14 0.42
Ethnic Composition 
% Black 32% 0.25 36% 0.34
% Latino 13% 0.12 4% 0.06
% White 52% 0.29 56% 0.36
Location 
Urban 26% 0.44 42% 0.50
Suburban 13% 0.34 12% 0.32
Town 12% 0.33 18% 0.39
Rural 48% 0.50 28% 0.45
Observations (school-years) 2511 138
Traditional Public 
School Charter School
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TPS (%) Charter (%) 
No Move 68.0% 63.0%
Transferred Schools 3.7% 1.9%
Exit Data 28.3% 35.2%
Observations 
(teacher-years) 12307 162
Table 4.2. Teacher Mobility Rates, by Sector (2009-2010)
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Table 4.3 Description of 4th and 5th Grade Teachers by Type of Move
%/mean SD %/mean SD %/mean SD %/mean SD
Teacher Characteristics 
Effectiveness 0.00 (0.16) 0.01 (0.16) -0.01 (0.16) -0.02 (0.16)
Female 89% (0.31) 90% (0.31) 90% (0.30) 89% (0.31)
Race 
Asian 1% (0.07) 1% (0.08) 0% (0.07) 0% (0.06)
Black 13% (0.34) 13% (0.33) 17% (0.37) 14% (0.34)
Hispanic 1% (0.08) 0% (0.07) 0% (0.07) 1% (0.09)
American Indian 1% (0.08) 0% (0.07) 0% (0.05) 1% (0.10)
Multiracial 0% (0.05) 0% (0.05) 1% (0.08) 0% (0.05)
White 85% (0.36) 85% (0.35) 82% (0.39) 84% (0.37)
Classroom Characteristcs 
Class size 22 (3.65) 22 (3.59) 21 (3.64) 21 (3.79)
% LEP 6% (0.01) 6% (0.01) 6% (0.01) 6% (0.01)
% FRLP 50% (0.07) 50% (0.07) 51% (0.07) 50% (0.07)
Ethnic Composition 
% Black 29% (0.05) 29% (0.05) 30% (0.05) 29% (0.05)
% Latino 9% (0.01) 9% (0.01) 10% (0.01) 9% (0.01)
% White 55% (0.06) 55% (0.06) 54% (0.06) 54% (0.06)
School Characteristcs 
Average Enrollment 571 (200) 576 (198) 576 (237) 560 (199)
% FRLP Eligible 54% (0.23) 53% (0.23) 60% (0.24) 57% (0.23)
Title 1 School Eligible 75% (0.43) 73% (0.44) 75% (0.43) 79% (0.41)
Crimes per 100 Students 0.16 (0.41) 0.15 (0.40) 0.24 (0.57) 0.18 (0.43)
Ethnic Composition 
% Black 33% (0.24) 31% (0.23) 41% (0.26) 34% (0.25)
% Hispanic 13% (0.12) 13% (0.12) 15% (0.13) 13% (0.13)
% White 51% (0.28) 52% (0.28) 41% (0.29) 48% (0.29)
Location 
Urban 29% (0.45) 29% (0.45) 41% (0.49) 28% (0.45)
Suburban 15% (0.36) 16% (0.37) 14% (0.34) 14% (0.34)
Town 12% (0.33) 11% (0.32) 10% (0.30) 15% (0.36)
Rural 43% (0.50) 44% (0.50) 36% (0.48) 43% (0.50)
Observations (teacher-years) 12496 8469 459 3541
No Move Transfer Exiting System Total Sample
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Table 4.4 Predicting Teacher Mobility using Multinomial Logits  (Math Sample) 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Key Independent Variables
Teacher Effectiveness -0.70 (0.30) * -1.12 (0.13) *** -0.69 (0.30) * -1.13 (0.14) ***
Charter School -0.95 (0.62) 0.18 (0.22) -1.04 (0.68) 0.18 (0.22)
Charter School*Effectiveness -1.93 (4.77) 0.24 (1.02)
Teacher Characteristics 
Female 0.14 (0.15) -0.02 (0.07) 0.14 (0.15) -0.02 (0.07)
Class size 0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01)
Race 
Asian -0.60 (0.74) -0.52 (0.32) -0.60 (0.74) -0.52 (0.32)
Black -0.23 (0.16) -0.08 (0.07) -0.23 (0.16) -0.08 (0.07)
Hispanic -0.30 (0.76) 0.65 (0.30) * -0.30 (0.76) 0.65 (0.30) *
American Indian -1.40 (1.09) 0.14 (0.29) -1.40 (1.09) 0.14 (0.29)
Multiracial 0.45 (0.64) -0.38 (0.41) 0.45 (0.64) -0.38 (0.41)
White (ref.)
School Characteristcs 
Average Enrollment 0.00 (0.00) *** 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) *** 0.00 (0.00)
Average Enrollment Squared 0.00 (0.00) *** 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) *** 0.00 (0.00)
% Free/Reduced Price Lunch Eligible 0.61 (0.45) 0.27 (0.24) 0.62 (0.45) 0.27 (0.24)
Title 1 School Eligible -0.07 (0.20) 0.06 (0.09) -0.07 (0.20) 0.06 (0.09)
Crimes per 100 Students 0.27 (0.16) 0.12 (0.07) 0.27 (0.16) 0.12 (0.07)
Ethnic Composition 
% Black -0.64 (0.97) -0.79 (0.47) -0.64 (0.97) -0.79 (0.47)
% Hispanic -1.21 (1.01) -1.22 (0.52) * -1.21 (1.01) -1.22 (0.52) *
% White -1.78 (0.93) * -1.22 (0.44) ** -1.78 (0.93) * -1.22 (0.44) **
Location 
Urban (ref) 
Suburban -0.09 (0.21) 0.06 (0.11) -0.09 (0.21) 0.06 (0.11)
Town -0.20 (0.25) 0.38 (0.11) *** -0.21 (0.25) 0.38 (0.11) ***
Rural -0.14 (0.17) 0.16 (0.08) * -0.14 (0.17) 0.16 (0.08) *
Observations (teacher-years) 12469 12469 12469 12469
SE SE SE SE
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school, and models include year fixed effects.  
*Statistically significant at the 5% level       **Statistically significant at the 1% level       ***Statistically significant at the .1% level 
Without Interaction With Interaction
Transfer Exit Data System Transfer Exit Data System
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Coef. Coef.
Charter School -0.13 (0.00) *** -0.03 (0.00) ***
Grade -0.02 (0.00) *** -0.01 (0.00) ***
Charter School X Grade 0.04 (0.00) *** 0.04 (0.00) ***
Structural Change 
Non-Structural Change -0.02 (0.00) *** -0.02 (0.00) ***
Structural Change -0.06 (0.00) *** -0.03 (0.00) ***
No Change (ref.)
Demographics
Female -0.03 (0.00) *** 0.13 (0.00) ***
Free/Reduced Price Lunch -0.17 (0.00) *** -0.20 (0.00) ***
Retention 0.23 (0.01) *** 0.17 (0.01) ***
Limited English Proficient -0.41 (0.00) *** -0.54 (0.00) ***
Disability Status -0.27 (0.00) *** -0.43 (0.00) ***
Academic Giftedness 0.54 (0.00) *** 0.50 (0.00) ***
Race 
Asian 0.33 (0.01) *** 0.11 (0.01) ***
Black -0.66 (0.00) *** -0.60 (0.00) ***
Hispanic -0.20 (0.00) *** -0.27 (0.00) ***
American Indian -0.53 (0.01) *** -0.53 (0.01) ***
Multiracial -0.25 (0.00) *** -0.21 (0.00) ***
White (ref.)
Observations (student-years) 3861493 3843599
Note: Grade recentered at 0. Models include interactions between student demographic 
controls and grade. Robust SEs in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at the 5% level       **Statistically significant at the 1% level       
***Statistically significant at the .1% level 
Appendix Table A1. Linear Multilevel Growth Models, 2004-2011
Math Standardized 
Test Score 
Reading Standardized 
Test Score
SE SE
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APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL RESULTS FROM CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Key Independent Variables
Teacher Effectiveness -0.92 0.65 -1.91 0.29 *** -0.91 0.65 -1.89 0.29 ***
Charter School -0.93 0.62 0.20 0.22 -0.93 0.62 0.20 0.21
Charter School*Effectiveness -0.14 8.83 -1.20 2.68
Teacher Characteristics 
Female 0.14 0.15 -0.02 0.07 0.14 0.15 -0.02 0.07
Class size 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01
Race 
Asian -0.58 0.74 -0.49 0.32 -0.58 0.74 -0.49 0.32
Black -0.21 0.16 -0.06 0.07 -0.21 0.16 -0.06 0.07
Hispanic -0.31 0.76 0.63 0.31 * -0.31 0.76 0.63 0.31 *
American Indian -1.38 1.09 0.19 0.30 -1.38 1.09 0.18 0.30
Multiracial 0.45 0.64 -0.40 0.42 0.45 0.64 -0.40 0.42
White (ref.)
School Characteristcs 
Average Enrollment 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00
Average Enrollment Squared 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00
% Free/Reduced Price Lunch Eligible 0.61 0.45 0.27 0.24 0.61 0.45 0.27 0.24
Title 1 School Eligible -0.07 0.20 0.06 0.09 -0.07 0.20 0.06 0.09
Crimes per 100 Students 0.27 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.27 0.16 0.11 0.07
Ethnic Composition 
% Black -0.64 0.97 -0.78 0.46 -0.64 0.97 -0.78 0.46
% Hispanic -1.20 1.01 -1.21 0.52 * -1.20 1.01 -1.21 0.52 *
% White -1.78 0.93 * -1.21 0.44 ** -1.78 0.93 * -1.20 0.44 **
Location 
Urban (ref) 
Suburban -0.09 0.21 0.06 0.11 -0.09 0.21 0.06 0.11
Town -0.20 0.25 0.38 0.11 ** -0.20 0.25 0.38 0.11 ***
Rural -0.14 0.17 0.17 0.08 * -0.14 0.17 0.17 0.08 *
Observations (teacher-years) 12469 12469 12469 12469
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school, and models include year fixed effects.  Base category is teacher remains in school. 
Appendix Table C1. Predicting Teacher Mobility using Multinomial Logits  (Reading Sample) 
SE SE SE SE
Without Interaction With Interaction
Transfer Exit Data System Transfer Exit Data System
*Statistically significant at the 5% level       **Statistically significant at the 1% level       ***Statistically significant at the .1% level 
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Appendix Table C2. Predicting Teacher Retention Using LPM 
Coef. Coef. 
Key Independent Variables
Teacher Effectiveness 0.23 0.03 *** 0.38 0.06 ***
Charter School -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.05
Teacher Effectiveness*Charter School -0.01 0.24 0.30 0.59
Teacher Characteristics 
Class Size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Race 
Asian 0.10 0.05 * 0.10 0.05
Black 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Hispanic -0.13 0.07 -0.12 0.07
American Indian -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07
Multiracial 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.08
White (ref.)
School Characteristcs 
Average Enrollment 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 *
Average Enrollment squared 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 *
% Free/Reduced Price Lunch Eligible -0.07 0.05 -0.07 0.05
Title 1 School Eligible -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Crimes per 100 Students -0.03 0.02 * -0.03 0.02 *
Ethnic Composition 
% Black 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.11
% Hispanic 0.28 0.12 * 0.28 0.12 *
% White 0.29 0.10 ** 0.29 0.10 **
Location 
Urban (ref.) 
Suburban -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Town -0.07 0.02 ** -0.07 0.02 **
Rural -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02
Observations (teacher-years)
Math Sample Reading Sample 
SE SE
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school, and models include year fixed effects.
*Statistically significant at the 5% level       **Statistically significant at the 1% level       
***Statistically significant at the .1% level 
